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To what extent do civil liberties affect economic development? This disser-
tation addresses this question in two essays. The first chapter (joint with Roger
Betancourt) provides a new economic interpretation of civil liberties as rights over
a person’s most basic human asset: her own self. The importance of these rights to
economic development is based on the principle that property rights-defined over a
broad set of “property”-are crucial for economic growth. The empirical literature
to date shows little support for such claims related to civil liberties, however, with
ambiguous evidence on the role of these rights in driving long-run growth. Using
newly available data from Freedom House, we find that one of the recently disaggre-
gated categories of civil liberties explains income differences across countries more
powerfully and robustly than any other measure of property rights or the rule of law
considered. This component, entitled “Personal Autonomy and Individual Rights,”
evaluates the extent of personal choice over issues such as where to work, study, and
live, as well as a broader set of property rights and other choices.
While the first chapter finds that greater civil liberties can substantially im-
prove long-run economic development, the second chapter identifies a key friction
in this relationship. In countries that lack complementary institutions, civil liber-
ties governing individual mobility can complicate credit transactions. By allowing
individuals to move to locations where less is known about their prior defaults,
mobility freedoms induce opaqueness and can result in credit rationing. I develop
an instrumental variable estimation to study these effects, which would otherwise
be complicated by omitted variable bias and endogeneity. Using household survey
data from Guatemala, I instrument for individual migration with the interaction of
violence patterns and individual sensitivities toward that violence. Using this ap-
proach, I find that the act of migration within a country actually causes individuals
to have significantly less access to credit, primarily because lenders are concerned
about these borrowers’ opportunistic default.
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Civil liberties have been the subject of extensive study by political scientists
and legal specialists, partly because these fields are concerned with these rights as
important ends in and of themselves. Relatively little work, however, among the
recent economic literature examining the impact of institutions on economic develop-
ment has focused on civil liberties. Recent attention has instead been concentrated
on other measures intended to represent governance and the rule of law. Those em-
pirical investigations that have incorporated civil liberties–most often measured by
the Freedom House (FH) Civil Liberties index–have found mixed evidence of their
influence on economic growth (Levine and Renelt (1992), King and Levine (1993)).
As my dissertation shows, however, civil liberties have important ramifica-
tions for economic development. Civil liberties–particularly rights over a person’s
geographic and social mobility–have a significant positive impact on long-term eco-
nomic growth, but they also complicate credit transactions in countries that lack
complementary institutions. This dissertation posits specific theoretical channels
through which these effects take place. Perhaps just as crucially, however, it de-
velops identification strategies to empirically test these hypotheses, spanning both
cross-country and household-level analyses. One common element encountered at
both levels of analysis is the difficulty of using pure experimental techniques to ad-
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dress the possibility of reverse causation and omitted variable bias. Randomizing
national institutions and individual migration is problematic for a number of rea-
sons. Instead, I use instrumental variables approaches, finding striking evidence
that individual mobility and other personal autonomy rights are uniquely powerful
in explaining long-run differences in incomes across countries, but that mobility can
also be a source of rationing in credit markets. Policymakers considering mobility
improvements should therefore pay particular attention to complementary institu-
tions, such as contract enforcement and information-sharing systems.
The first chapter in the dissertation (joint with Roger R. Betancourt) provides
a new economic interpretation of civil liberties as rights over a person’s most basic
human asset: her own self. Traditional definitions of property rights can apply to
human capital as they do to other physical and intangible assets. The importance
of these rights to economic development is based on the principle that property
rights–defined over a broader set of “property”–are crucial for economic growth
(Olson 2000). It would thus not be surprising to find extensive evidence that the
development of rigorously enforced civil liberties in some countries has led to ex-
tensive long-run growth in these nations. In fact, the literature to date shows little
support for such claims.
The first chapter of this dissertation thus offers important results on the impact
of civil liberties on income levels. We find that one of Freedom House’s recently
disaggregated categories of civil liberties is far superior to any of the alternative
property rights indicators available. This component, entitled “Personal Autonomy
and Individual Rights,” evaluates the extent of personal choice over issues such as
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where to work, study, and live, as well as a broader set of property rights and other
choices.
While the first essay finds striking evidence that expanding certain civil lib-
erties can substantially improve long-run economic development, the second essay
identifies a key friction in this relationship. In countries that lack complementary
institutions, civil liberties governing individual mobility can complicate credit trans-
actions. Information on market participants is crucial to efficiency, but mobility
can actually diminish the information available. For example, individual migration
across space can cause individuals in the migrant’s destination to be much less in-
formed about the migrant than would those in her origin. If this dissipation of
information happens in dimensions along which individuals can move (geographic
space, social space), this movement can generate important inefficiencies.
The scope for such informational problems expands as inefficiencies in contract
enforcement rise. The second chapter in this dissertation explores this relationship
in the context of credit markets. These markets involve substantial risk of reneging
by one party because the exchange happens over sometimes long periods of time.
An extensive literature has focused on problems that arise in this context1, but
individual mobility has rarely been cited as a cause of any of these frictions.
One study that does explicitly link migration and credit access is La Ferrara
(2003), which finds that migrants in rural Ghana are less likely to receive credit
from kin group networks than from other sources, such as moneylenders, banks, or
1Conning and Udry (2005) provide a useful survey of these issues, as applied to agricultural
settings.
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cooperatives. La Ferrara concludes that kin groups are particularly susceptible to
rationing of credit to migrants because they rely intensively on reciprocity as an
incentive for loan repayment. However, because it estimates the likelihood that a
given loan will come from a kin member rather than another source, La Ferrara’s
study does not identify the full extent to which migrants are penalized in receiving
loans from banks. The second chapter of this dissertation is the first study to ask
whether formal lenders in developing countries also have enforcement challenges in
lending to migrants.
The chapter outlines a theoretical model linking weak contract enforcement,
individual mobility, and access to credit. When credit contracts are not enforced in
courts, so that borrowers who are able to repay are not compelled to do so, lenders
often turn to information-based solutions to exclude known defaulters from future
loans. In these environments, mobility freedoms can actually create incentives for
individuals to act strategically by reneging on contracts and moving to settings
where less may be known about their previous behavior. Past migration may thus
become a signal of previous conduct on loan contracts, albeit an imperfect one.
Naturally, lenders use these signals and restrict their exposure to a particularly
risky set of borrowers (migrants). This creates an externality in which defaulters hide
their previous action by moving, spreading its costs over other movers. The second
chapter outlines these effects by building on the theoretical model outlined by Ghosh,
Mookherjee and Ray (2000). My contribution is to incorporate the dissipation of
information across space and heterogeneous mobility costs into this framework. The
resulting model yields a new dimension of rationing, as the heightened incentives
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for default among the most mobile individuals prevent more creditworthy migrants
from getting loans.
Does the data bear out this inefficiency? This dissertation offers a novel ap-
proach to answering this question, which would otherwise be complicated by a num-
ber of critical issues, including the possibility of omitted variable bias and endo-
geneity. I use an instrumental variables approach to address these issues, using
household survey data collected in Guatemala in 2000. As an instrument for mi-
gration, I consider individual respondents’ sensitivity to violence or crime, coupled
with regional patterns of actual violence and crime across the country. Those born
into particularly dangerous locations and who happen to be particularly sensitive to
violence or crime are especially likely to move. These migrants most often land in
relatively safer regions, where they appear to be about as stable and credit-worthy
as natives of these regions. This IV approach eliminates any confounding effects
and reverse causality and identifies an inefficiency in which lenders do not provide
loans to credit-worthy migrants.
I find strong evidence that individuals whose propensity to migrate is driven
by violence-related concerns are 12.5% less likely to have a loan from a bank or co-
operative. The effect is even starker among those individuals who have applied for
loans. Moreover, by explicitly considering the verifiability of a migrant’s income, the
social capital at her disposal, and lending by her family, neighbors and other infor-
mal sources, I rule out alternative explanations of these effects. The results strongly
support the theory that, with weak contract enforcement and information-sharing
geographically limited to informal networks, mobility creates an informational ex-
5
ternality that limits the amount of credit lenders are willing to extend to migrants,
some of whom may indeed be creditworthy.
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Chapter 2
Civil Liberties and Economic Development (joint with Roger
Betancourt)
2.1 Introduction
Relatively little work among the extensive recent empirical literature exam-
ining the impact of institutions on economic development has focused on the role
played by civil liberties. Recent attention has instead been concentrated on other
measures intended to represent governance and the rule of law. Those empirical
investigations that have incorporated civil liberties–most often measured by the
Freedom House aggregate Civil Liberties index–have found mixed evidence of their
influence on economic growth. For example, while Isham, Kaufmann and Pritchett
(1997) present robust evidence of the impact of the aggregate Civil Liberties index
on the performance of World Bank projects, Levine and Renelt (1992) find that
the significance of the index is quite sensitive to changes in the conditioning set.
King and Levine (1993) include the index as a covariate in their analysis of the
relationship between financial development and growth, finding no evidence of civil
liberties’ role in shaping economic growth.
We return attention to the role of civil liberties in the context of the ongo-
ing discussion about which institutions matter for growth, noting that these rights
7
may be better indicators of a government’s long-term commitment to the rule of
law than other proxies examined in the literature, as argued by Betancourt (2004,
2006). Building on conceptual work by North (1990) and Olson (2000), we identify
the prevalence of the rule of law, indicated by the extent of civil liberties, as a plau-
sible mechanism acting as a crucial determinant of long-term economic growth and
development.
Given the mixed and limited empirical evidence supporting these propositions,
we offer striking results on the impact of civil liberties on income levels. These new
empirical findings became feasible as a result of Freedom’s House decision to make
publicly available the four main components of its aggregate civil liberties indicators
at the end of 2006. Freedom House also disaggregated its index of political rights
into its three main components. Thus, we are also able to compare the empirical
relationship of these governance indicators to income levels.
In explaining differences in income levels across countries, our work is most
closely related to that of Acemoglu and Johnson (2005) on unbundling institutions.
Their work focused on differentiating between contracting institutions and property
rights institutions; our work focuses on differentiating among different concepts and
measures of property rights institutions. Our most intriguing result shows that,
using the same methodology as these authors, one of Freedom House’s recently dis-
aggregated components of civil liberties is far more relevant to income differences
than any of the alternative property rights indicators available, including the best
indicator Acemoglu and Johnson identify. This component, entitled ”Personal Au-
tonomy and Individual Rights,” evaluates the extent of personal economic freedoms
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such as the choice of ownership form, employment, residence and education, as well
as social freedoms such as choice of marriage partners and family size.
We further find that this fundamental result remains remarkably robust as we
address a variety of well-cited criticisms of cross-country studies and some not so
well-cited ones. These include reverse causation, important omitted variables such
as geography and human capital, and a battery of sensitivity tests. Throughout, we
find that Personal Autonomy and Individual Rights remains more important than
any of the other institutional variables considered in terms of both the magnitude
of its effect and its statistical significance.
This paper also contributes to the institutions literature in more subtle forms.
First, it shows that the rule of law is a broader concept than the formal or informal
protection against government and elite predation or expropriation, as character-
ized by Acemoglu and Johnson (2005) and Olson (2000). Our results highlight the
importance of protection of individual economic rights and personal social freedoms
from government activities as well as from social norms and non-governmental col-
lective infringement. Second, it provides an opening for research into the question of
why economies in East Asia are able to grow rapidly under non-democratic regimes.
The beginnings of an answer lies in our main finding that not all civil liberties are
created equal in terms of their impact on economic growth. Finally, this result also
suggests the exploration of whether different human and property rights may matter
more at different points on an economic development path.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: In Section 2.2, we lay out
a conceptual framework that relates the prevalence of civil liberties and the rule
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of law to the operation of certain types of markets and economic growth. We
then discuss the measurement of these institutions in Section 2.3, comparing the
newly disaggregated Freedom House Civil Liberties data with other measures used
in the literature to capture the existence and quality of property rights institutions.
Using these measures, we then examine the empirical evidence on the role of civil
liberties in determining long-term economic growth in an ordinary least squares
setting (Section 2.4). We address issues of reverse causation in Section 2.5, and
incorporate omitted variables such as human capital and geography in Section 2.6.
We perform a variety of robustness checks on the sensitivity of the above results to
a variety of other issues, including features of the data, in Section 2.7. By way of
a conclusion, in Section 2.8 we offer a perspective on our three main contributions
and their implications for future research.
2.2 Conceptual Framework: Why Civil Liberties Matter
Succinctly put, the logic of our analysis is based on two main propositions and
three subsidiary ones. The two main ones are: First, the prevalence of the rule of law
is a key factor determining the rate of economic growth in the long term. Second, the
protection of human rights through the provision of civil liberties is one of the most–if
not the most–fundamental indicators of the prevalence of the rule of law in a society.
The three subsidiary propositions help suggest potential causal mechanisms for the
operation of the first two. First, modern economies consist of two types of markets,
spontaneous (and irrepressible) markets and socially contrived markets, and it is the
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latter that underlie modern economic growth. Second, a critical distinction between
these two types of markets is the role that the state performs in supporting these
markets. More precisely, the prevalence of the rule of law is an essential determinant
of the level of operations in socially contrived markets. Third, financial markets and
tangible capital markets are important examples of socially contrived markets. The
rest of this section discusses the basis for these propositions and their implications
in some detail.
What does one mean by the prevalence of the rule of law in economics? It
certainly encompasses the protection of property rights. This is a widely accepted
view in discussions of institutions. Property rights are usually defined at the most
elementary level as the right to consume services of, the right to generate income
from and the right to alienate an asset, e.g., Barzel (1989). What seems to have been
relatively ignored in recent literature is that the protection of human rights as part
of the rule of law follows from the same logic. Violations of human rights (through
loss of life, imprisonment or other less dramatic restrictions on the capabilities to
make choices and enjoy their consequences) deprive individuals of property rights
that emanate from every human being’s most fundamental asset: her own person.
These violations are inconsistent with the prevalence of the rule of law in a society.
Part of the reason for this lack of recognition in viewing human rights as a
separate but equally important dimension of property rights is an understandable
but misplaced reluctance to place something as precious as life under the same
general label as a physical asset, such as a house. We merely note that the logic
is the same without making any assertion as to the intrinsic valuations of these
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different rights. Furthermore, even within the category of human rights, distinctions
are made between traditional rights, such as life and liberty, and more modern
ones, such as economic and social freedoms. The former are frequently described as
“first generation” human rights and the latter are frequently described as “second
generation” human rights, e.g. Kaufmann (2004). Civil liberties usually encompass
both sets of human rights.
Olson (2000, Ch.10) distinguishes between an active role for the state and
a passive role. The former entails the provision of various types of public goods;
the latter consists of constraining itself from abusing its monopoly of power and
engaging in predatory behavior on its own behalf or that of a few small groups.
Betancourt (2004) argues that the best indicator of a state’s intentions to perform
this passive role (and thus of its intentions to abide by the rule of law) is the
state’s explicit commitment to the protection of human rights. In their essay on
institutions as a fundamental cause of economic growth, Acemoglu, Johnson and
Robinson (2005, p.390) explain why commitment problems inherent in the use of
political power can lead “...to economic inefficiencies and even poverty.” One way of
addressing some of these commitment issues on the part of governments is through a
credible pledge to the protection of human rights. With the development of modern
means of communication in the last century, it is easy to verify the fulfillment of
these commitments. Furthermore, with the emergence of organizations devoted to
monitoring governments’ performance in these dimensions, the importance of human
rights as indicators of performance could increase substantially in the future.
In their work on unbundling institutions, Acemoglu and Johnson (2005) distin-
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guish between institutions supporting private contracts (“contracting institutions”)
and institutions constraining government and elite expropriation (“property rights
institutions”). These authors put forth specific measures of each type of institu-
tion. Legal Formalism and Constraints on the Executive are the ones that perform
best empirically in their respective categories. Based on these two measures, they
show the unimportance of contracting institutions and the importance of property
rights institutions in explaining differences in the level of income across countries
and, thus, their relative importance in explaining long-term economic growth. We
view these results as an illustration of the first proposition, since property rights
institutions and the specific measure used by Acemoglu and Johnson can be viewed
as one manifestation of what one means by the prevalence of the rule of law.
While Constraints on the Executive emphasizes the balance of powers aspect of
the rule of law, civil liberties emphasize the protection of individual liberties aspect.
Since the prevalence of the rule of law is a complex phenomenon, difficult to capture
both conceptually and empirically, we view our emphasis on civil liberties as a
complementary step to Acemoglu and Johnson’s work in unbundling of institutions.
Specifically, we claim that we have a conceptually better measure of the provision
of the rule of law (and thus of property rights institutions) than the measure relied
upon most heavily by Acemoglu and Johnson1.
Our subsidiary propositions are based on an earlier literature that can be used
to provide suggestive causal mechanisms for the empirical results that support the
1In addition, our measure also performs better in explaining income levels in a variety of em-
pirical settings shown below.
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first proposition. The distinction between markets with transactions that are self-
enforcing and markets with transactions that are not self-enforcing can be traced
back at least to North (1990)2. He labels these two types of markets as traditional
and modern, respectively, and identifies three conditions that lead to self-enforcing
transactions: small numbers of market participants, repeated interactions among
them and plentiful information on their characteristics. Similar conditions have been
used in the recent industrial organization literature on contracting to explain why re-
lational contracting in developing countries is self-enforcing, for example Thompson
(2005).
The idea that there are two types of markets relevant for understanding eco-
nomic growth was also put forth forcefully by Clague, Keefer, Knack and Olson
(1999) [henceforth CKKO]. They point out the differential role of government in
these two types of markets. In markets where transactions are not self-enforcing,
which they label as socially contrived, they argue that one needs contract enforce-
ment mechanisms, or else these markets will not exist or will operate at low levels of
transactions. Exceptions to the need for government in socially contrived markets
arise when the gains from exchange appear so large to participants on both sides
of the market that they are willing to incur the risk of non-fulfillment, as occurs in
some illegal markets. CKKO label these markets as irrepressible. Just as in mar-
kets where transactions are self-enforcing, which CKKO label spontaneous, explicit
contract enforcement mechanisms are not necessary for these markets to thrive.
2Parenthetically, North (1990) also emphasized the importance of an impartial judiciary and
its role as a third party enforcement mechanism in determining economic performance in modern
economies, where markets with transactions that are not self-enforcing predominate.
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These authors acknowledge the possibilities of non-governmental mechanisms that
provide enforcement services, but they stress the importance of governments in pro-
viding contract enforcement mechanisms in socially contrived markets and suggest
contract-intensive money (CIM) as a measure of these institutions. CKKO stress
that socially contrived markets are the most important for modern growth.
Further insight into the role of government in different types of markets arises
from papers in a conference to honor Mancur Olson (Azfar and Cadwell 2003). In
self-enforcing and irrepressible markets, the main role of the state is to provide
“market augmenting services” such as law and order (the ability of governments
to protect citizens from predation by other citizens, i.e., to prevent crime against
property and persons by other individuals) and a medium of exchange. In socially
contrived markets, however, the state needs also to provide contract enforcement
services, for example through an independent judiciary. This is the essential market
augmenting service in socially contrived markets identified by CKKO. It is also con-
sistent with North’s view of the difference between traditional and modern markets.
Betancourt (2004) argues that a commitment to the rule of law is another
public good or “market augmenting service” that the state must provide for socially
contrived markets to function at a high level3. This commitment entails constraining
3McGuire (2003) argues that Olson’s assertions about market augmenting government follow
from Samuelson’s analysis of public goods and Bator’s analysis of market failure. He credits Olson
with bringing to our attention the idea that “...the effective functioning of private markets is itself a
collective good: the better functioning they are, the more public benefit they provide.” Betancourt
(2006) notes that viewing market augmenting services as public goods implies that they play the
role of public inputs into the operation or production of market services. The traditional modeling
of public inputs such as infrastructure in the public finance literature, however, treats them as
having a direct effect on production subject to economy wide diminishing returns and views them
as produced under the assumption of diminishing returns, for example Feehan and Matsumoto
(2000). The market augmenting services identified here seem to be subject to several features
that lead to non-convexities, such as increasing returns and thresholds in their production and
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government and elite expropriation, as argued by Acemoglu and Johnson (2005), or
preventing predation by government over citizens, as argued by Olson (2000). It
differs from the public good “law and order” in that the latter focuses on predation
by other citizens or non-government groups. It also differs from the public good
“contract enforcement services” in that it is a much broader concept4. Furthermore,
while there are private substitutes for the role of government in the provision of
contract enforcement services (or of law and order), there are no private substitutes
for the role of government in the provision of rule of law. Thus, we believe that the
essential role of government in these two types of markets lies in the provision of the
”rule of law” in socially contrived markets, rather than the contract enforcement
mechanisms emphasized by CKKO and North5.
Both financial markets and tangible capital markets imply transactions with
strong inter-temporal dimensions. For participants on one side of these markets,
many of the benefits from transactions take place in the future, while many of the
costs of these transactions take place up-front or close to the present. Thus, these
markets are socially contrived because transactions in them are unlikely to be self-
enforcing. Both of these markets are usually viewed as important for economic
growth. We believe that civil liberties are important for these markets to function
network externalities in their effects. We merely note this issue but do not pursue it directly in
what follows.
4From a legal perspective, Summers (2003) illustrates the distinction in the case of secured
loans by calling contract enforcement institutions for this type of loans first-order rules and the
general principles of the rule of law, second-order rules.
5Incidentally, one of the most effective mechanisms for implementing the rule of law (in terms
of protecting property rights as well as first and second generation human rights) plays a similar
role in providing law and order and enforcing contracts: namely, the existence of an impartial
judiciary.
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at a high level due to their socially contrived nature, suggesting possible causal
mechanisms between civil liberties and long-term growth or development.
2.3 Measurement Issues: Civil Liberties and the Unbundling of In-
stitutions
We follow Acemoglu and Johnson (2005) and differentiate between contracting
institutions and property rights institutions. We differ from them in that we focus
on identifying measures which capture our broader emphasis on the role of human
rights as an indicator of the prevalence of the rule of law. Throughout, we compare
our preferred measures to the one highlighted by Acemoglu and Johnson, namely
the Polity IV Constraints on the Executive variable. This variable, produced by the
Polity IV Project, captures the degree of constraints on politicians and politically
powerful elites. This measure ranges from one to seven, where a higher score in-
dicates greater constraints. We follow Acemoglu and Johnson (2005) in using the
average score over the 1990’s. We also compare these measures to the one empha-
sized by CKKO, namely CIM, which is defined as the contract-based share of the
money supply or CIM = (M−C)
M
, where C is currency and M is the money supply,
including currency, demand deposits and time deposits.
In 2006, Freedom House for the first time ever agreed to release the data for
every country on each of the four subcategory scores making up the organization’s
aggregate civil liberties index. Scores on the aggregate index have been available
for many years. Table 2.1 presents the fifteen overarching questions representing
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different dimensions of civil liberties on which each country is rated. Each question
is rated on a score of 0 (worst) to 4 (best). These questions are then aggregated into
four subcategories. Subcategories (D), (F) and (G) are composed of four dimensions
each, whereas subcategory (E) is composed of three. Thus, the subcategory indexes
for the former range from 0-16 and the one for the latter ranges from 0-12. The
scoring for the aggregate Civil Liberties index is slightly different.
A more detailed look at subcategory (F), which is mislabeled “Rule of Law”
from our point of view, suffices to establish the lack of correspondence between
the conceptual measure described in the previous section and what this empirical
measure represents. This subcategory combines four dimensions that capture very
different phenomena. The first one (Is there an independent judiciary?) reflects the
existence of a mechanism that is important for the rule of law as well as contract
enforcement services and/or law and order. The second one reflects the rule of
law with respect to procedural issues and the third one reflects the prevalence of
law and order. The fourth one reflects the prevalence of non-discrimination against
population segments by the government.
The other three subcategories are more homogeneous in what they capture.
Freedom of Expression and Belief (D) captures the ability of media (first question)
religious institutions (second question) educational institutions (third question) and
private individuals and organizations (fourth question) to express their views. This
measure corresponds to one dimension of first generation human rights. The subcat-
egory Association and Organizational Rights (E) captures the ability of individuals
and organizations, including trade unions and peasant organizations, to pursue their
18
interests collectively. It also corresponds to a (different) dimension of first genera-
tion human rights. Finally, Personal Autonomy and Individual Rights (G) captures
the ability of individuals to exercise their economic rights with respect to employ-
ment, location, and ownership of property without severe infringements from the
state or other individuals or groups (questions 1, 2, and 4), as well as their personal
social freedoms with respect to marriage partners and family size regardless of gen-
der (question 3). This measure corresponds to second generation human rights, as
stressed by Kaufmann (2004)6. Subcategory G also reflects more intensely than the
other categories interactions of individuals within a society as opposed to interac-
tions with the state or its organizations.
Our dataset consists of the original data for 60 countries used by Acemoglu
and Johnson (2005) supplemented in several ways. First and foremost, we merged
this dataset with the Freedom House data on civil liberties and its subcategories, as
well as with the organization’s political rights index and its three subcategories7. We
also incorporated the data on CIM from International Financial Statistics mentioned
previously and added two other datasets that are important for our robustness tests.
The first one simply extends the sample by including all the OECD countries that
are not ex-colonies and thus excluded from the original 60 countries; the second one
6Blume and Voigt (2007) provide a more recent contribution on human rights that is similar in
approach to Kaufmann’s.
7When Freedom House disaggregated the civil liberties indicator into subcategories, it also
disaggregated its political rights indicators. Some contributions to the empirical explanation of
long-term growth have used Freedom’s House aggregate indicator of political rights, for example
Barro (2003). Our conceptual framework also implies that governance indicators, such as political
rights, could be used as indicators of the prevalence of the rule of law. Indeed, the Polity IV
Constraints on the Executive can be viewed as a measure of political rights. Hence, we also
consider below the role of these indicators in affecting long-term growth.
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consists of data we gathered on gross secondary school enrollments and “geographic”
variables for the original set of 60 countries. Table A.1 in the Appendix offers
summary statistics on the dataset for the sample of 60 countries.
In Table 2.2, we present the simple correlations between all four subcategories,
the aggregate index (Civil Liberties), Constraints on the Executive, CIM, the po-
litical rights subcategories and secondary school enrollment rates. Not surprisingly,
all of the civil liberties subcategories and the aggregate index are more highly corre-
lated among themselves than with Constraints on the Executive or CIM. The latter
has the lowest correlations with other indexes by a wide margin8.
The “Rule of Law” (F) and the Personal Autonomy and Individual Rights (G)
subcategories have their highest correlation with the aggregate index whereas Free-
dom of Expression and Belief (D) and Freedom of Assembly (E) have their highest
correlation with each other. On the other hand, the aggregate index, Freedom of
Expression and Belief and Freedom of Assembly have their lowest correlation with
Personal Autonomy and Individual Rights. It is also worthwhile to note here that
some of the civil liberties subcategories are more closely correlated with certain
political rights subcategories than with some of the other civil liberties measures.
For example, Freedom of Expression and Belief and Association and Organizational
Rights are more highly correlated with “Electoral Process” (A) and “Political Plu-
ralism and Participation” (B) than with other civil liberties. Meanwhile, the Rule of
Law subcategory is most closely correlated with the “Functioning of Government”
8We are including CIM for completeness. Its original proponents viewed it as an indicator of
contract enforcement services, not of the prevalence of the rule of law. In practice, it can capture
features of both since the likelihood of flights from contract based money would be expected to be
less where the rule of law prevails than where it does not prevail.
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(C). Finally, the secondary school enrollment rate is substantially more correlated
with Personal Autonomy and Individual Rights than with any of the other institu-
tional variables.
2.4 Civil Liberties and Economic Development: A Simple OLS Com-
parison
One of our arguments is that the prevalence of the rule of law as indicated
by the provision of civil liberties is a better measure of the institutions needed for
growth than the alternative measures used in the literature. In this section, we
examine the empirical power of these new measures of property rights institutions
by comparing them to the main alternative used in the literature to explain long-
term growth. We start our analysis by incorporating these measures as substitutes
for Constraints on the Executive in the main empirical specification employed by
Acemoglu and Johnson (2005).
In the first panel of Table 2.3-A, we present the results of OLS regressions
of the log of GDP per capita in 1995 on two institutional variables: Legal For-
malism, intended to capture contracting institutions; and one of a set of different
measures intended to capture property rights institutions. For comparison with ex-
isting literature, we include the variable most often used by Acemoglu and Johnson
to represent property rights institutions, namely Constraints on the Executive, in
the first column, and CIM in the second column. The remaining columns consider
subcategories of civil liberties. The results of are unambiguous. Legal Formalism is
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statistically insignificant at the 5% level in all specifications. All of the civil liberties
indicators are positive and statistically significant at the 1% level. The main differ-
ence between these measures lies in their explanatory power. It is especially striking
that the civil liberties subcategory Personal Autonomy and Individual Rights ex-
plains about 75% more of the variation in GDP per capita than the second best
measure, namely Constraints on the Executive9.
Freedom House’s political rights index is made up of three subcategories: Elec-
toral Process (A), capturing the existence and degree of freedom, fairness and hon-
esty in elections; Political Pluralism and Participation (B), capturing the nature of
participation in the political process by individuals and groups; and Functioning
of Government (C), measuring the effectiveness of governance10. In Table 2.3-B,
we repeat the exercise in the previous table using political rights measures as the
institutional variable capturing the prevalence of the rule of law in our regressions
explaining long-term growth11.
One measure of civil liberties, Personal Autonomy and Individual Rights, out-
performs each of the political rights variables by a wide margin in terms of ex-
planatory power. Indeed, none of the political rights variables performs as well as
the Constraints on the Executive, which is the second best performing variable by
this simple criterion. Of course, there are other relevant criteria that one can use
9Not surprisingly, using a non-nested J-test, the specification relying on the Personal Autonomy
and Individual Rights variable is accepted while the one relying on Constraints on the Executive
is rejected at the 1% level when tested against each other. Similar results hold for the other
indicators. We present the results of this test in Table A.2 of the Appendix.
10For more details, see Freedom in the World 2005, Freedom House (2006, pp. 780-781).
11The aggregate political rights index performed worse than two of the three subcategories and,
thus, was excluded.
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for these comparisons, particularly statistical and economic significance, as well as
criticisms that one can make of these OLS regressions, such as the need to correct
for reverse causation and omitted variables. We address the two main criticisms
in the next two sections. Here, we note that all these institutional variables are
statistically significant at the 1% level. Indeed if one were to use the magnitude of
the t-ratio as a criterion, Personal Autonomy and Individual Rights would perform
best. With respect to economic significance, we have included the beta coefficients12
in the table but we note that they can be sensitive to the inclusion of covariates.
Hence, the main point to be made here is that all the property rights variables re-
flect substantial economic significance in terms of their impact on the level of per
capita income. Comparisons between the beta coefficients of explanatory variables
are best made after we include additional covariates.
Summing up the main result from this section, the Personal Autonomy and
Individual Rights subcategory of civil liberties performs best (in terms of explaining
the highest percentage of the variation in the level of income per capita) in a simple
comparison with any of the institutional variables that can be sensibly chosen as
alternatives to capture property rights institutions or the prevalence of the rule of
law. Despite the well known biases in this simple approach, especially when using
cross-country data, it would seem unlikely that they would always work out in
favor of this particular measure by sheer accident. After all, the other alternatives
considered here are subject to the same type of biases in exactly the same setting.
12Beta coefficients are the estimates from a regression in which all of the variables have been
standardized (Kennedy 2003). They can be interpreted as the change in the dependent variable
in terms of its standard deviations resulting from a change of one standard deviation in the inde-
pendent variable.
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2.5 Civil Liberties and Economic Development: Reverse Causation
Since the possibility of reverse causation between the institutional variables
and GDP per capita is well-established, we re-estimate the simple specification of
the previous section using 2SLS. As instruments for the institutional variables, we
use the log of population density in 1500 and a dummy for British legal origin13.
The results, which are presented in the two panels of Table 2.4, are similar in terms
of signs to those in the previous section. Nevertheless while all coefficients in the top
panel increase in magnitude, they decrease in statistical significance compared to
the OLS estimation. The end result is that all five civil liberties indicators continue
to be statistically significant at the same levels as with OLS (four at the 0.001
level and one at the 0.01 level) but Constraints on the Executive and CIM are now
statistically significant at lower levels than with OLS (0.01 and 0.05, respectively.)
Interestingly, Table 2.4-B reveals that the political rights indices experience
an increase in statistical significance compared to the OLS results. Indeed, one of
them (A) attains statistical significance at the 0.001 level compared to the 0.01 level
for OLS. Nonetheless, the Personal Autonomy and Individual Rights subcategory
continues to have the highest t-ratio of any of the institutional variables in this
setting. Thus, correcting for reverse causation preserves the basic results of the OLS
specification. Namely, Legal Formalism does not seem to matter in explaining the
level of per capita income across these 60 countries, but property rights institutions
do matter regardless of how they are measured.
13Acemoglu and Johnson also use settler mortality as an instrument in their analysis but the
validity of this instrument has been challenged (Albouy 2006). We use this instrument instead of
population density in 1500 as a robustness check and discuss it in Section 2.6.
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Our analysis, thus far, confirms the basic results of Acemoglu and Johnson
(2005) by showing that they hold for a variety of other measures of property rights
institutions not considered by these authors. It also extends their analysis by show-
ing that one of these alternative measures performs empirically better than theirs
with respect to explanatory power and statistical significance in exactly the same
setting. From the substantive point of view, however, this is a somewhat surprising
result. The measure that performs better corresponds most closely to second gener-
ation human rights and not to first generation human rights14. However, this result
is less surprising when one realizes that this measure captures economic dimensions
expected to impact growth directly, such as economic mobility and the ability to
exercise ownership rights.
2.6 Civil Liberties and Economic Development: Omitted Variables
We now consider how the previous results are affected by the introduction
of additional variables identified as important in previous literature. In particular,
we consider geography and human capital. With only 60 observations and the
multicollinearity and endogeneity issues that affect cross-country data, however,
there is always a trade-off between the need to preserve degrees of freedom and the
dangers of omitted variable bias. Hence, we drop the Legal Formalism variable from
all subsequent analysis in the interest of parsimony. Its lack of impact in any of the
earlier results suggests little danger of omitted variable bias.
14The fact that political rights do not perform as well is not surprising, because they are often
used as a measure of democracy and it is often found that democracy does not explain long-run
growth, for example Mobarak (2005) or Acemoglu, Johnson, Robinson and Yared (2008).
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There are a number of dimensions of a country’s geography that have been
viewed as important in determining long-run growth by a number of authors. For
instance, latitude has been used by Hall and Jones (1999) and others as an indicator
of tropical climate. Thus, we consider the absolute value of a country’s latitude as
an explanatory variable. Similarly, whether or not a country is landlocked has been
used by Faye, et al. (2004) to capture access to markets and infrastructure costs.
Therefore we also consider an indicator of whether or not a country is landlocked as
an explanatory variable15. Additionally, Kiszewski, et al (2004) have developed an
indicator of a country’s exogenous malaria ecology; Sachs (2003, 2005) shows that
the environment for this disease affects a country’s GDP. Hence, we also consider
the malaria ecology index as an explanatory variable16.
Glaeser, et al.’s (2004) criticism of the original Acemoglu, Johnson and Robin-
son (2001) article on the “Colonial Origins of Comparative Development” argues
that settlers brought to the colonies at least one other characteristic known to be
useful for growth besides institutions, namely human capital. Thus, we investigate
the effect of human capital on our results. For this purpose, we need a human cap-
ital measure that is available for our sample of 60 countries. We follow Mankiw,
Romer and Weil (1992) in using the secondary school gross enrollment ratio as our
measure of human capital17.
15The dummy for landlocked countries was drawn directly from the Faye et al (2004) dataset;
it equals 1 for landlocked countries and 0 for countries that border an ocean or major body of
water. The landlocked countries included in our sample of ex-colonies are: Bolivia, Botswana,
Burkina Faso, Ethiopia, Malawi, Mali, Nepal, Niger, Paraguay, Swaziland, Uganda, Zambia, and
Zimbabwe.
16The malaria ecology index developed by Kiszewski, et al (2004) represents the relative stability
of malaria transmission based on the biologic characteristics of mosquitoes present in a country.
The index varies between 0 and 39.
17We use the 1995 gross secondary school enrollment rate drawn from the World Bank’s World
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Human capital introduces another issue of reverse causation since economic
growth generates resources that can be used for educational purposes. Having
dropped Legal Formalism from the analysis, we could use British legal origins as
an instrument for the human capital variable. One argument for this use of British
legal origins is that the common law tradition supported unconditioned private con-
tracting as opposed to socially-conditioned private contracting (La Porta, Lopez de
Silanes and Shleifer 2008). Thus, the common law tradition allowed agents finding
some form of education useful to develop it, as opposed to waiting for a socially
approved authority to recognize the need.
Since this use of British legal origins as an instrument for education is not
an established practice in the literature, we checked the first stage regressions and
found that legal origins was a strong instrument for Legal Formalism but a much
weaker instrument for secondary school enrollment. These results are presented
in Table A.3-A of the Appendix. In the empirical growth literature, ethnic frac-
tionalization has been identified as an instrument for human capital, for example
Durlauf, Johnson and Temple (2005). The rationale is that the higher the level of
ethnic fractionalization in a society, the lower is the level of human capital, since
education is normally publicly provided and any groups controlling the state would
be disinclined to empower other groups through education.
We adopt the measure of ethnic fractionalization employed by Alesina, De-
veleeschauwer, Easterly, Kurlat and Wacziarg (2003)18. Alesina et al show that this
Development Indicators. The measure is defined as the number of total pupils enrolled in secondary
school, regardless of age, expressed as a percentage of the total population in the theoretical age
group for secondary education (World Bank EdStats Database).
18The ethnic fractionalization variable is computed as one minus the Herfindahl index of eth-
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measure is relatively independent of both European legal origins and property rights
measures, but that it robustly explains variations in literacy rates across countries,
even in panel data. It can be seen from Table A.3-B that this measure is a better
instrument for secondary school enrollment than British legal origin in terms of both
statistical significance and explanatory power.
Alesina et al do not show that ethnic fractionalization affects GDP growth
solely through its effect on schooling. To the extent that ethnic fractionalization neg-
atively affects GDP through other channels, this would cause the effects of schooling
to be biased upwards. If we find that civil liberties nevertheless remain significant
in a specification where the effects of schooling are magnified, we can consider this
a lower bound on the true effect of civil liberties.
We limit the presentation of results to two property rights variables, namely
Constraints on the Executive, which best captures aspects of balance of power, and
Personal Autonomy and Individual Rights, which best captures second generation
human rights and performs best among the civil liberties variables19. Tables 2.5-A
and 2.5-B present the OLS results. It can be seen that the civil liberties variable
dominates the Constraints on the Executive variable in every possible comparison
in terms of predictive performance and statistical significance. Indeed, the addi-
tion of the human capital variable renders Constraints on the Executive statistically
insignificant regardless of whether or not the geography variables are included. It
nolinguistic group shares in each country and reflects the probability that two randomly selected
individuals from a population belong to different groups.
19We checked that the inclusion of additional covariates did not change the relative performance
of the other civil liberties or political rights variables relative to Personal Autonomy and Individual
Rights (G). It did not.
28
can also be seen that the institutional variables have significant explanatory power
by themselves and that human capital adds substantially to explanatory power de-
spite the inclusion of the institutional variables. On the other hand, the geography
variables add to explanatory power given the institutional variables, but their contri-
bution disappears once both institutions and human capital variables are included.20
Both the institutional variables and the human capital variables are subject
to reverse causation biases. Thus, we present 2SLS results in Tables 2.6-A and
2.6-B, using population density, ethnic fractionalization and British legal origins
as instruments in the first stage21. The 2SLS results continue to favor the civil
liberties variable relative to the Constraints on the Executive one. In particular,
the inclusion of human capital continues to render Constraints on the Executive
statistically insignificant.
With respect to the geography and human capital variables, the results differ
dramatically between OLS and 2SLS. The malaria ecology variable is not statisti-
cally significant in any 2SLS specification. Both the human capital variable and
the civil liberties variable are statistically significant at the 5% level when included
without the geography variables. Inclusion of the latter, however, renders the human
capital variable statistically insignificant when Personal Autonomy and Individual
Rights is the institutional variable. While initially surprising, this result may also
reflect the effect of second generation human rights on the level of human capital.
20We chose to include the malaria ecology variable by itself rather than either of the other two
geography variables because it is the one that performs best in terms of explanatory power and
statistical significance.
21We performed over-identification tests on the instruments and the hypothesis that they had a
direct effect in the regression was rejected in every case.
29
Summing up, the prevalence of the rule of law through the provision of civil
liberties, measured in terms of personal autonomy and individual rights, remains
an important determinant of long-term growth and, thus, of economic development
when geography and human capital are included in the analysis. It does so with
and without correction for reverse causation. While magnitudes change substan-
tially depending on the particular specification, the economic significance does not
disappear in any specification.
2.7 Sensitivity Analysis
In view of the broad skepticism concerning the use of cross-country data, we
performed a series of sensitivity analyses on our basic results to enhance confidence in
their reliability. First, we checked the sensitivity of the results to the use of data for
other years. Second we checked for outliers and assessed the effect of dropping them.
Third, we extended the sample to non-colonies for the OLS estimation. Fourth, we
used an alternative instrument instead of population density (settler mortality) in
the 2SLS estimation. Fifth, we extended the analysis by including more than one
property rights variable at a time. Finally, we checked the sensitivity of the results
to the inclusion of regional dummies.
In explaining long-term growth, we have posited as a dependent variable the
level of GDP per capita achieved in 1995. Our preferred measure of property rights
institutions measures the level of Personal Autonomy and Individual Rights in 2005.
To explore the sensitivity to these differences in dates, we constructed an estimate
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of the latter variable for 199522. The results of using the estimated 1995 indicator
of Personal Autonomy and Individual Rights are very similar to the results for the
2005 indicator used in Tables 2.3 and 2.4. For example, the explanatory power of
this 1995 estimated variable (R2 = 0.4585) is far closer to the 2005 indicator (R2 =
0.4717) than to that of any of the other indicators in Table 2.3, and the coefficient
of the estimated variable (0.214) and its standard deviation (0.03) are quite close
the corresponding coefficient estimates in Table 2.3 (0.238 and 0.03, respectively).
We also obtained GDP per capita data for 2003 and re-did our original analysis,
with the same conclusion.
One way to test for outliers is to exclude one country at a time from the
sample and observe the impact on the results. This exercise makes no difference
to the results in Tables 2.3 and 2.4. A more systematic way of doing so is to
use the criteria for dropping outliers noted in Kennedy’s Guide to Econometrics
(2003, Chapter 20): DFFITS (DFBETA) or the normalized change in the OLS
estimate of the i-th value of the dependent variable (the normalized change in an
OLS coefficient estimate) resulting from omitting the i-th observation. Using these
criteria we identified 18 observations that could be candidates for exclusion under
either of these tests. Dropping all of these observations at the same time leaves us
with 42 countries. In a regression comparable to those in Table 2.3, the explanatory
power of the Personal Autonomy and Individual Rights variable was 0.46, and its
22This was done by subtracting from the 2005 level the following term: [CL (2005) -CL (1995)]*
(16/7)* ρ (2005). The first element is the difference in the levels of the aggregate civil liberties
indicator; the second element corrects for the difference in scales between the aggregate index
and the Personal Autonomy and Individual Rights indicator; the third element (ρ) is just the
correlation between the two indicators in 2005. Thus, if the correlation were the same in the two
years, our estimate would equal the actual value in 1995.
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coefficient was 0.243 with a standard error of 0.05. The results for the other measures
of institutions were similar and the basic conclusion of superior performance for this
variable remained unaltered.
Next, we extended the sample by incorporating all OECD countries not pre-
viously included in the dataset because they are not former colonies (Australia,
Canada, Mexico, New Zealand and the U.S. were already included). This procedure
increases the sample size from 60 to 83. We present the OLS results in the top
panel of Table A.4-A of the Appendix. Personal Autonomy and Individual Rights
continues to have the greatest explanatory power by a wide margin in explaining
long-term growth.
As a final check on the results in Sections 2.3 and 2.4, we used the settler mor-
tality index used by Acemoglu and Johnson (2005) rather than population density
in 1500 as the instrument for property rights institutions in the 2SLS regressions.
This mortality index is somewhat controversial; see Albouy (2006) and Acemoglu,
Johnson and Robinson’s (2006) reply. In our context, use of this index as an instru-
ment reduces sample size to 51 observations. Table A.4-B of the Appendix presents
the results. They are the same as before. The Personal Autonomy and Individ-
ual Rights subcategory is the only property rights institutional variable statistically
significant at the 0.1% level when explaining long-term growth.
In addressing the omitted variables problem in the previous section, we faced
the problems of multicollinearity and endogeneity. In doing sensitivity analysis
of these results, the same two problems arise in a more powerful form. Hence,
we will drop the geography variables and consider other additions to the human
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capital and institutional variables in our sensitivity tests. In the previous three
sections, we compared the performance of the property rights variables when each
entered into the estimation one-at-a-time. Our next sensitivity test examines what
happens when multiple property rights variables are included in the estimation.
Table 2.7-A shows the effect of adding several of the other institutional variables to
the main OLS findings of Section 2.5 (i.e., to the estimation shown in Table 2.5-A,
column 2). Even when controlling for human capital, the coefficient on Personal
Autonomy & Individual Rights is significant and economically important in nearly
every OLS regression, while almost none of the other institutions variables are (the
only exception is the “Rule of Law” category (F), which has a negative coefficient
in this specification).
In correcting the results for the endogeneity of the additional institutional
variable, however, it is problematic to use the previous three instruments. From
Table A.3-A we know that British legal origin is not a good instrument for the
institutional variables that are used as indicators of property rights. We thus use as
an additional instrument the proportion of Muslims in each country’s population.
The first stage is presented in Table A.3-C. The Muslim share is a reasonable
instrument at least for one of the added institutional variables, Constraints on the
Executive. The logic is that the greater the proportion of Muslims in a country, the
greater the influence of religious leaders and the fewer checks and balances on the
executive. Mobarak (2005) shows that the Muslim share of the population robustly
explains various measures of democracy, even while controlling for indicators of oil-
producing countries, those involved in wars, and the inequality of income within
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countries. Mobarak then uses an indicator of a Muslim majority in the population
as an instrument in estimating the effect of democracy on cross-country differences
in economic performance.
Our second stage results including multiple institutional variables are pre-
sented in Table 2.7-B. None of the institutional variables apart from Personal Au-
tonomy & Individual Rights have coefficients that are statistically significant at the
5% level. They tend to lower the level of statistical significance of human capital
and Personal Autonomy & Individual Rights relative to the basic result in Table
2.6-A. But the coefficient of Personal Autonomy & Individual Rights retains its sign
in all cases, and it remains statistically significant in two out of the five cases. Just
as in the case of the instruments for human capital, to the extent that the Muslim
instrument negatively affects GDP through other channels, this would cause the
effects of Constraints on the Executive to be positively biased. The fact that the
coefficient on this variable is negative and insignificant is therefore notable.
Finally, Table 2.8-A presents the results of adding regional dummies for Sub-
Saharan Africa or Latin America and the Caribbean to the basic 2SLS specification.
Since the dummies are exogenous, we use the same instruments as in Table 2.6 to
correct for endogeneity. Both dummies are statistically insignificant, with t-ratios
less than unity. The estimates of the coefficients for both human capital and second
generation human rights do not change much in either case. Nonetheless, including
the Latin America and the Caribbean dummy does drive the coefficient of second
generation human rights below statistical significance at the 5% level.
34
2.8 Implications
One contribution of our empirical analysis is to show that the dominance of
property rights institutions over contracting institutions in explaining long-term
growth is not limited to the measures considered by Acemoglu and Johnson (2005),
such as Constraints on the Executive and Risk of Expropriation. On the contrary,
using exactly the same methodology and sample, this dominance extends to a wide
range of other variables. Prominent among these other variables are four dimensions
of civil liberties recently provided at a disaggregated level by Freedom House.
It would be foolish to conclude from this finding that contracting institutions
are irrelevant for development, for several reasons. First, only one measure of con-
tracting institutions was considered, Legal Formalism, and there could be others
not yet explored in the literature that would generate different results. Second, it
is possible that these institutions don’t matter empirically at the aggregate cross-
country level, but would matter at lower levels of aggregation. Finally and foremost
in our judgment, our prior belief is that public provision is essential for property
rights and the rule of law, but not contract enforcement.
To further elaborate: while there are private substitutes for the lack of con-
tract enforcement institutions, there are no private substitutes for the rule of law. If
the operation of socially contrived markets at a high level is important to sustained
economic growth, private substitutes for contract enforcement institutions, such as
corruption, may arise and operate in some countries. These private substitutes
can allow economic activities to take place at a high level even though the public
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provision of contract enforcement institutions through legal formalism is missing.
Thus, the result we established empirically does not necessarily imply that contract
enforcement institutions are irrelevant for development. What it does suggest is
that public provision of these institutions, if it holds up for other measures of pub-
licly provided contracting institutions, is not an essential public input for economic
development.
A second contribution of this paper–and perhaps its most important–is the
unbundling of property rights institutions. Civil liberties matter in determining the
level of long-term economic growth as indicators of the prevalence of the rule of law
in general and of property rights institutions in particular. The civil liberties that
matter most in this setting, however, are those associated with second generation
human rights. The salience and robustness of this empirical finding is very unusual
for analyses of cross-country data. We view this result as an unusually strong
and auspicious step in the process of unbundling property rights institutions and
in understanding their role in the economy. Thus, it is desirable to highlight the
implications of our results for a couple of fundamental issues in the institutions and
economic development literature.
It is difficult to believe that one can maintain high levels of second generation
rights without having some minimal levels of first generation rights. Nonetheless,
the well-documented and exceptional sustained economic growth of the East Asian
economies since World War II is consistent with the idea that second generation
rights are the most important. Vietnam and China are two recent and dramatic
examples of countries with sustained growth despite divergence between second
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generation human rights and other property rights institutions. Their scores on
second generation human rights are 7 and 8, respectively, out of a possible 16. The
next highest score for either country in any of the disaggregated civil liberties sub-
categories is 4 out of 16. These correspond to Freedom of Expression for China
and Rule of Law for Vietnam. Indeed, one can plausibly argue that these recent
scores on second generation human rights are the result of improvements concurrent
with sustained economic growth. Regardless of this argument, understanding the
nature of the relationships between different civil liberties subcategories in affecting
long-term growth is a potentially fruitful area of future research. One might also
expect some relationship between a minimal level of political rights and these sec-
ond generation human rights. Using China and Vietnam as illustrations again, one
finds that neither country scores higher than a 1 out of a possible 12 or 16 in any of
the three political rights subcategories. Thus, future research should examine the
interactions between political and economic institutions in the context of economic
development. Some progress in this area can be found in Acemoglou and Robinson
(2006) and North, Wallis and Weingast (2008).
A third contribution of this paper lies in the conceptual framework, which
helps us interpret our first empirical result, and also helps us interpret the unusual
implications of our second empirical result noted above. That is, one possible reason
for the exceptional growth performance of China and Vietnam, despite their low
scores on civil liberties and political rights, is that at low levels of development
growth can be based on activities in markets that are not socially contrived, for
example agricultural markets. Yet as one attains higher levels of development, it
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becomes impossible to sustain growth without socially contrived markets and it is
at this point that civil liberties and perhaps political rights begin to matter. In
these early stages of the development process, the civil liberties that matter most
are the ones associated with second generation human rights, since they have more
direct effects on economic activities through improving labor mobility and the full
exercise of ownership rights.
To conclude, we indicate how the subsidiary propositions of the conceptual
framework provide implications for future research as well as a possible and plausi-
ble causal mechanism for our main empirical result. One way to proceed in terms
of future research is to explore in greater detail the role of civil liberties in different
socially contrived markets. For example, some of the most important socially con-
trived markets in an economy are financial markets since they usually involve the
exchange of short-term payments for paper claims or promises of future benefits.
Future research may contribute to the debate about the causal impact of financial
development on economic growth (for example, Levine (2005)), by focusing on the
impact of civil liberties in the development of narrowly defined financial markets,
such as stock, credit, and insurance markets, as especially relevant socially con-
trived markets. For instance, one might assess the degree to which greater civil
liberties may both deepen financial development and expand access to finance or
determine whether foreign investment is pursued through stock markets, debt mar-
kets, or direct investment. This same causal argument, however, suggests a possible
and plausible mechanism for our empirical finding that civil liberties in the form of
second generation human rights are the ones with the greatest impact on long-term
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growth. Namely, these human rights are the ones that capture those aspects of the
rule of law most important for socially contrived markets, including financial mar-
kets. These socially contrived markets are the ones that determine economic growth
over the long-term.
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D. Freedom of Ex-
pression and Belief
1. Are there free and independent media and
other forms of cultural expression?
2. Are religious institutions and communities free
to practice their faith and express themselves in
public and private?
3. Is there academic freedom and is the educa-
tional system free of extensive political indoctri-
nation?




1. Is there freedom of assembly, demonstration,
and open public discussion?
2. Is there freedom for nongovernmental organi-
zations?
3. Are there free trade unions and peasant or-
ganizations or equivalents, and is there effective
collective bargaining?
F. Rule of Law 1. Is there an independent judiciary?
2. Does the rule of law prevail in civil and criminal
matters? Are police under direct civilian control?
3. Is there protection from political terror, un-
justified imprisonment, exile, or torture, whether
by groups that support or oppose the system? Is
there freedom from war and insurgencies?
4. Do laws, policies, and practices guarantee equal




1. Does the state control travel or choice of resi-
dence, employment, or institution of higher edu-
cation?
2. Do citizens have the right to own property and
establish private businesses? Is private business
activity unduly influenced by government officials,
the security forces, political parties/organizations,
or organized crime?
3. Are there personal social freedoms, including
gender equality, choice of marriage partners, and
size of family?
4. Is there equality of opportunity and the ab-











































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 2.3-A: OLS, dependent variable is log GDP per capita in 1995
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Legal Formalism -0.130 -0.054 -0.163 -0.142 -0.062 -0.049
(0.101) (0.113) (0.107) (0.108) (0.109) (0.087)








Expression & Belief (0.035)
(D) <0.398>
Associational & 0.131**
Organ. Rights (E) (0.042)
<0.373>




& Indiv. Rights (G) (0.034)
<0.676>
Observations 60 60 60 60 60 60
R-squared 0.27 0.143 0.183 0.164 0.185 0.472
Standard errors in parentheses and beta coefficients in brackets. *** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, *
p < 0.05.
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Table 2.3-B: OLS, dependent variable is log GDP per capita in 1995
(1) (2) (3)












Observations 60 60 60
R-squared 0.189 0.14 0.196
Standard errors in parentheses and beta coefficients in brackets. *** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, *
p < 0.05.
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Table 2.4-A: 2SLS, dependent variable is log GDP per capita in 1995
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Legal Formalism -0.002 0.18 -0.15 -0.044 0.078 -0.084
(0.211) (0.339) (0.178) (0.204) (0.184) (0.130)








Expression & Belief (0.084)
(D) <1.083>
Associational & 0.444**
Organ. Rights (E) (0.135)
<1.269>




& Indiv. Rights (G) (0.073)
<1.059>
Observations 60 60 60 60 60 60
The instruments used in the 2SLS specifications are the log of population density in 1500 and a
dummy for British legal origin. Standard errors in parentheses and beta coefficients in brackets.
*** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05.
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Table 2.4-B: 2SLS, dependent variable is log GDP per capita in 1995
(1) (2) (3)












The instruments used in the 2SLS specifications are the log of population density in 1500 and a
dummy for British legal origin. Standard errors in parentheses and beta coefficients in brackets.
*** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05.
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Table 2.5-A: OLS, dependent variable is log GDP per capita in 1995
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Personal Autonomy 0.241*** 0.070* 0.200*** 0.072** 0.069*
& Indiv. Rights (G) (0.034) (0.027) (0.032) (0.027) (0.029)
<0.685> <0.200> <0.567> <0.205> <0.196>
Secondary School 0.030*** 0.028*** 0.027***
Enrollment, 1995 (0.003) (0.003) (0.004)
<0.756> <0.707> <0.703>









Observations 60 60 60 60 60
R-squared 0.469 0.805 0.587 0.81 0.811
Standard errors in parentheses and beta coefficients in brackets. *** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, *
p < 0.05.
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Table 2.5-B: OLS, dependent variable is log GDP per capita in 1995
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Constraints on 0.295*** 0.047 0.182* 0.039 0.04
Executive (0.067) (0.042) (0.071) (0.044) (0.044)
<0.499> <0.080> <0.308> <0.067> <0.068>
Secondary School 0.033*** 0.032*** 0.031***
Enrollment, 1995 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
<0.845> <0.823> <0.789>









Observations 60 60 60 60 60
0.249 0.787 0.372 0.788 0.793
Standard errors in parentheses and beta coefficients in brackets. *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05.
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Table 2.6-A: 2SLS, dependent variable is log GDP per capita in 1995
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Personal Autonomy 0.426*** 0.225* 0.384*** 0.237* 0.238*
& Indiv. Rights (G) (0.072) (0.096) (0.073) (0.107) (0.111)
<1.209> <0.638> <1.090> <0.673> <0.676>
Secondary School 0.024* 0.021 0.022
Enrollment, 1995 (0.010) (0.013) (0.015)
<0.602> <0.545> <0.575>









Observations 60 60 60 60 60
The instruments used in the 2SLS specifications are the log of population density in 1500, a
dummy for British legal origin, and ethnic fractionalization. Standard errors in parentheses and
beta coefficients in brackets. *** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05.
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Table 2.6-B: 2SLS, dependent variable is log GDP per capita in 1995
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Constraints on 0.988*** 0.519 0.868** 0.32 0.302
Executive (0.269) (0.365) (0.301) (0.230) (0.230)
<1.669> <0.877> <1.466> <0.540> <0.509>
Secondary School 0.023 0.035** 0.039**
Enrollment, 1995 (0.016) (0.011) (0.012)
<0.590> <0.907> <0.990>









Observations 60 60 60 60 60
The instruments used in the 2SLS specifications are the log of population density in 1500, a
dummy for British legal origin, and ethnic fractionalization. Standard errors in parentheses and
beta coefficients in brackets. *** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05
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Table 2.7-A: OLS, dependent variable is log GDP per capita in 1995
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Personal Autonomy 0.076* 0.066* 0.075 0.105* 0.149**
& Indiv. Rights (G) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
<0.216> <0.188> <0.214> <0.299> <0.422>
Secondary School 0.030*** 0.029*** 0.029*** 0.029*** 0.028***
Enrollment (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)









& Belief (D) <-0.02>
Associational & -0.038
Organ. Rights (E) (0.03)
<-0.11>
Rule of Law (F) -0.068*
(0.03)
<-0.23>
Observations 60 60 60 60 60
R-squared 0.806 0.814 0.805 0.81 0.821
Standard errors in parentheses and beta coefficients in brackets. *** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, *
p < 0.05
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Table 2.7-B: 2SLS, dependent variable is log GDP per capita in 1995
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Personal Autonomy 0.340* 0.155 0.546 0.438* 0.276
& Indiv. Rights (G) (0.150) (0.339) (0.352) (0.211) (0.156)
<0.965> <0.441> <1.550> <1.243> <0.783>
Secondary School 0.025* -0.015 0.004 0.013 0.022*
Enrollment (0.012) (0.095) (0.023) (0.014) (0.010)









& Belief (D) <-0.601>
Associational & -0.184
Organ. Rights (E) (0.150)
<-0.525>
Rule of Law (F) -0.046
(0.101)
<-0.155>
Observations 60 60 60 60 60
The instruments used in the 2SLS specifications are the log of population density in 1500, a dummy
for British legal origin, ethnic fractionalization, and the share of Muslims in the population in 1980.
Standard errors in parentheses and beta coefficients in brackets. *** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, *
p < 0.05
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Table 2.8-A: 2SLS, dependent variable is log GDP per capita in 1995
(1) (2) (3)
Personal Autonomy 0.225* 0.197* 0.190
& Indiv. Rights (G) (0.096) (0.086) (0.114)
<0.638> <0.559> <0.540>
Secondary School 0.024* 0.024* 0.026*





Latin America & 0.066
Caribbean Dummy (0.226)
<0.030>
Observations 60 60 60
The instruments used in the 2SLS specifications are the log of population density in 1500, a dummy
for British legal origin , and ethnic fractionalization. *** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05
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Chapter 3
A Mobility Curse? The Impact of Migration on Access to Credit
3.1 Overview
A well-documented stream of literature suggests that informational issues sur-
rounding an individual’s repayment history can lead to substantial rationing in
formal credit markets. In many developing countries that lack robust contract en-
forcement and national information sharing institutions, credit markets depend on
local information and reputation to bolster repayment incentives. In such contexts,
migration across locations reduces the amount of information available about an in-
dividual in her destination. Moreover, individuals can escape damaging information
by switching to locations where their past actions are less well-known. Migrants
thus offer a unique set of potential borrowers who are particularly informationally
opaque, and among whom strategic default may be particularly problematic. Thus
we might expect to find exacerbated credit rationing among individuals who have
migrated in such contexts.
Few studies have examined migrants under this lens. Eliana La Ferrara (2003)
shows that among Ghanaian villagers, migrants are much less likely to obtain loans
from kinsmen, who are particularly reliant on reputation and generalized reciproca-
tion in enforcing loan repayment, than from other sources such as banks or cooopera-
tives. Given its focus on informal borrowing among social groups, La Ferrara (2003)
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does not address to what extent informational and enforcement issues differentially
affect migrants when they seek loans in the formal credit market, where reciprocity
is not generally at issue. In a different context, Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales (2004)
find that migrants from the south of Italy to its north are less likely to use checks or
hold stocks, which they interpret as being related to the Southerners’ lower level of
social capital. However, the paper does not find any causal effect of migration per
se when controlling for the social capital in one’s birthplace and does not seriously
address the potential for reverse causality and omitted variables biases.
Does being a migrant in a developing country cause an individual to receive less
access to credit? I answer this question using data on individual migration and credit
holdings in Guatemala from 2000. This setting offers a compelling institutional en-
vironment: Guatemala saw significant internal (and international) migration both
during and after the bloody civil war that ended in 1996. Creditor rights have his-
torically been weakly protected in Guatemala, and in 2002 a World Bank appraisal
cited “poor judicial procedures for rapid debt collection” and an “inadequate legal
framework for secured transactions” as key problems affecting the financial sector.
Moreover, there was little information sharing among banks, cooperatives, or other
lenders in Guatemala prior to 2000. TransUnion opened the first credit bureau in
the country in 2001, and credit information sharing mechanisms among microfinance
institutions began appearing in late 2002. Thus, looking at Guatemalan survey data
from 2000 offers an opportunity to assess the effects of migration on formal credit
in the absence of well-developed credit information sharing and strong creditor pro-
tections. This is exactly the setting in which one would expect to find substantial
54
evidence of credit rationing affecting migrants.
To address the causal impact of migration on credit access, I adopt an instru-
mental variables approach that makes use of the broad thematic coverage of the
World Bank’s Living Standards Measurement Survey (LSMS), which includes ques-
tions about credit use, migration histories, and perceptions and experiences with
violence and crime. Given that migration within Guatemala has been driven in
part by patterns of violence within the country (Morrison 1993), I use the LSMS
to identify the individuals who are most concerned about violence or crime in their
local communities. These individuals are most likely to be sensitive to the actual
rates of violence in the areas in which they were born and to move away from par-
ticularly violent areas. This exogenous migration propensity can be used to study
the reduced access to credit associated with migration. Because migration due to
violence in one’s birthplace is essentially a one-time move, such migrants may be
no more likely to default on their future loans than natives of an area. However,
lenders are not likely to observe an individual’s sensitivity to violence or crime and
thus treat such individuals as they do all migrants. If these individuals experience
less access to credit than do natives, the matter becomes a noteworthy economic
inefficiency.
Migration is an important mechanism through which a country’s human re-
sources are aligned with their most productive uses. As countries grow economically,
they often transition from regionally segmented markets to integrated ones in which
both goods and people can move more freely across space. This work sheds light on
a key friction in this process: Migration weakens the information structure and thus
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restricts creditworthy individuals from obtaining loans. This research provides sup-
port for policies emphasizing the introduction of information sharing mechanisms in
developing countries and improvement and expansion of existing ones, particularly
as societies experience greater mobility.
The paper is laid out as follows: In section 3.2, I discuss the existing literature
on migration and access to credit. I then present an overview of a theoretical model
in section 3.3, illustrating how mobility can reduce access to credit in the presence of
weak contract enforcement (the details of the model are included in Appendix A.2).
Turning to the empirical evidence, I lay out an identification strategy in section 3.4,
followed by a discussion of the data in section 3.5. I offer results in section 3.6 and
consider alternative explanations for these findings in section 3.7. In section 3.8, I
conduct a series of robustness checks. Finally, I conclude in section 3.9.
3.2 Existing Literature
An extensive literature has focused on explaining the lack of access to credit
in developing countries. This literature largely focuses on imperfect enforcement
and informational asymmetries, founded in large part on Stiglitz and Weiss’s (1981)
theoretical work demonstrating how adverse selection and moral hazard can cause
backward bending supply curves and red-lining of potential borrowers (see Conning
and Udry (2005) for a survey of these issues, as applied to agricultural settings).
More recent papers have focused on empirically identifying the nature and scope
of the specific frictions. Karlan and Zinman (2007), for example, find that adverse
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selection and moral hazard lead to default rates as high as 20% in an experimental
setting. As Ghosh, Mookherjee, and Ray (2000) note, imperfect enforcement can
also be problematic, particularly in developing country contexts. Imperfect enforce-
ment refers to situations in which frictions arise from voluntary default. However,
individual mobility is rarely cited as a cause of any of these frictions. In explain-
ing the widespread belief that female borrowers of microfinance institutions are less
likely to engage in moral hazard, Armendariz de Aghion and Morduch (2005) sug-
gest that greater immobility may make default more costly for female borrowers
and monitoring cheaper for their lenders. Nonetheless, this suggestion that individ-
ual mobility may be a source of friction in credit markets has not been extensively
investigated.
As previously noted, one study that does explicitly link migration and credit
access is La Ferrara (2003), which finds that migrants are less likely to receive credit
from kin group networks than from other sources, such as moneylenders, banks, or
cooperatives. However, because it estimates the likelihood that a given loan will
come from each source, this study does not identify the extent to which migrants
are less likely to receive loans from any source at all. Moreover, La Ferrara finds that
reciprocity as an enforcement mechanism appears to dominate informational asym-
metries in explaining informal lending among kin groups–which is not necessarily
the case among banks and other formal lenders.
Another study that considers migration in a different context is Guiso, Sapienza
and Zingales (2004). In their study of the effects of social capital on the use of finan-
cial instruments such as checks and stocks in Italy, Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales
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assess to what degree this behavior changes when an individual moves to a new
region of the country. In OLS regressions, they find that migrants from the south
to the north of Italy are less likely to use these instruments, presumably because of
the Southerners’ lower level of social capital. However, they do not find significant
effects of migration per se, which is perhaps not surprising given that the confound-
ing effects of reverse causation and omitted variables. Moreover, Guiso, Sapienza
and Zingales focus largely on the differential use rather than access to credit among
these movers.
One mechanism through which credit rationing can be mitigated is relationship
lending, as Petersen and Rajan (1994) highlight. By building a relationship with
a borrower over an extended time period, a lender becomes better informed about
the borrower’s riskiness and thus can overcome moral hazard, adverse selection, and
contract enforcement issues. Migration to a new location often represents a severing
of those relationships, making migrants even more opaque relative to the average
native, who may have preserved his existing relationships with lenders.
Credit access issues specifically among Guatemalan households have been stud-
ied from a number of angles by Bruce Wydick and a series of coauthors. Wydick
(2002) tracks 239 clients of a microfinance institution in western Guatemala, finding
differing enterprise growth for women and men due in part to gender differences
in credit constraints on consumption and investment. Wydick, Karp, and Hilliker
(2008) identify substantial social imitation in obtaining credit among similar house-
holds, often through church and neighborhood networks. Wydick (1999) suggests
that social repayment enforcement may also be particularly potent in this setting.
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Moreover, Luoto, McIntosh and Wydick’s (2007) study of the credit information
system implemented among Guatemalan microfinance organizations beginning in
2002 finds a large positive impact on loan repayment. Although they have yet to
address whether the significant migration in Guatemala has been a source of credit
market frictions, these studies suggest that there is significant scope for both adverse
selection and moral hazard among rural Guatemalan borrowers.
There is also evidence indicating that a substantial portion of internal migra-
tion within Guatemala over the past three decades can be explained by violence
patterns. Micklin (1990) documents some of the conflict-related population move-
ment in the early and mid-1980’s. Morrison (1993) provides further evidence by
using the number of corpses found or politically motivated killings in each region to
explain both out- and in-migration rates for Guatemalan regions. Morrison’s find-
ings suggest that, at least at an aggregate regional level, migration patterns may
be correlated with violence, independent of any relationship between violence and
department-level income.
A much broader stream of literature has analyzed the self-selection of migrants
in terms of key unobserved characteristics, with Borjas (1987) serving as a seminal
paper. In these models, the information structure causing these characteristics to
be unobserved is generally taken as given. As Lucas (1997) suggests, relatively
little empirical work has addressed whether the act of migration actually obscures
information about the individual migrant and thus in some instances negatively
influences outcomes at the destination (Lucas highlights employment outcomes).
This issue is particularly crucial for credit markets, because information can be used
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to counteract weak contract enforcement. Moreover, Chiswick (1999) suggests that
any favorable self-selectivity among migrants would be expected to be weaker among
those who move primarily based on factors other than their own labor market or
entrepreneurial success, including those who move to “escape from real or perceived
threats to their freedom or safety.” These findings suggest that studying migrants
whose propensity to migrate is more related to local violence and crime as well
as their sensitivity to personal safety offers a useful setting to study frictions such
as weak contract enforcement and information sharing. Recent research has also
studied how existing migrant networks can reduce migration costs for potential
migrants, endogenizing the migration process (see, for example, Carrington et al
(1996) and McKenzie and Rappaport (2007)). One channel through which these
networks may operate is by improving information and enforcement mechanisms
that dampen negative frictions associated with migration.
3.3 Theory
As previously noted, theoretical explanations of credit rationing in develop-
ing countries typically highlight asymmetric information and contract enforcement
problems. These can be thought of separately as issues involving involuntary and
voluntary default, respectively. Asymmetric information problems, such as adverse
selection and moral hazard, involve involuntary default when borrowers are unable
to repay their loans. Models explaining rationing due to involuntary default assume
that contract enforcement compels borrowers to repay their loans when they are
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able to do so. In many less developed countries, however, contract enforcement is
generally problematic, and debt contracts may be particuarly challenging to enforce.
Thus, we can think of voluntary default arising out of poor contract enforcement
as a more basic economic friction1. In the empirical section, I assess the evidence
on the importance of contract enforcement relative to involuntary default in the
Guatemalan context. In this section, I describe a theoretical model of voluntary
default when individual borrowers are able to migrate. For brevity’s sake, I outline
the model’s main features and results in narrative form, with detailed mathematical
notation included in the Appendix.
Although much work on voluntary default has focused on sovereign govern-
ments (Eaton and Gersowitz 1981), Ghosh, Mookherjee and Ray (2000) [henceforth
GMR] show that an individual borrower’s ability to default strategically can also
affect within-country credit markets. In such contexts, information sharing and
implicit cooperation among lenders can sometimes reduce voluntary default by in-
centivizing borrowers to repay loans to avoid exclusion from future borrowing. That
is, lenders may share information on a borrower’s repayment history and follow a
trigger strategy that rejects loan applicants with prior defaults. GMR allow this
information sharing technology to vary in quality and show that a more effective
1This is not to say that informational asymmetry problems may not still be present after con-
tract enforcement is suitably strenghtened. For example, based on Stiglitz and Weiss’s (1981)
seminal paper on adverse selection, a credit market could exhibit greater rationing of migrants
if lenders “know less” about individual migrants’ returns than they do about individual natives.
Different risk formulations, however, have been shown to lead to over-lending rather than rationing
(for example, De Meza and Webb (1987)), and the equilibrium outcome depends on the distribu-
tions of the different parameters. An extensive literature has also studied the scope for moral
hazard in explaining credit rationing (see, for example, Jaffee and Russell (1976) and Aghion and
Bolton (1997)). This issue would particularly affect migrants when less is known about their
choices of inputs for projects, or, more generally, about their actions affecting their ability to repay
loans.
61
technology–one with better detection of past defaults–can lead to a more efficient
outcome.
I extend the GMR model in two key ways: First, I incorporate information
dissipation over space. The intuition is that information sharing among lenders
may be weaker when the lenders are located in different towns than when they are
located in the same town. Second, I extend the GMR model by incorporating het-
erogeneity in individuals’ migration costs, which include both a permanent and a
time-varying component. In essence, some particularly mobile entrepreneurs with
low permanent migration costs are perennial flight risks, while other entrepreneurs
may move because of a one-time shock. As lenders cannot observe these migra-
tion costs, they must form expectations about entrepreneurs’ future migration and
repayment strategies. In so doing, they lump migrants who are repeat defaulters
together with those who may have stronger repayment prospects.
The model involves entrepreneurs who make individual repayment and migra-
tion decisions conditional on their expectation of lender rationing of migrants, while
lenders make loan decisions conditional on the composition of repayment decisions
among migrants. An equilibrium is reached when these lending decisions are ratio-
nalized by entrepreneur behavior. As borrower strategies are discrete choices, closed
form solutions for this equilibrium may not exist. In the appendix, I use simula-
tions to show conditions on parameters under which it is not profit maximizing for
lenders to extend credit to all migrants. Under these conditions, lenders will choose
to ration loans to migrants in order to induce them to choose repayment of loans
rather than default, as well as to reduce the incentive for future migration (since
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this creates a stock of more opaque applicants).
The model provides an explanation of equilibrium credit rationing for mi-
grants. Because the set of indistinguishable migrants includes those who are likely to
default and move repeatedly, lenders may reduce their loan exposure to all migrants,
including those who plan to stay and repay their loans. Moreover, equilibrium ra-
tioning may emerge even if an individual lender would want to serve the marginal
migrant, because doing so would induce future migrants to default at higher rates.
This is akin to “macro-rationing” highlighted by Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984) as an
explanation of a positive equilibrium unemployment rate. The model highlights
the underlying issue that will be tested in the empirical section: there are some
individuals who make one-time moves and are unlikely to move again, but because
lenders cannot distinguish these from other migrants, they treat them as they do all
migrants. Under some conditions, lenders will therefore not provide loans to these
potentially creditworthy individuals because of their previous migration.
3.4 Empirical Strategy
My theoretical model suggests that loans to migrants who move because of an
exogenous factor (mobility shock) may be rationed, even if they would choose to stay
and repay their loans in the future. I test this assertion empirically by identifying
a factor that drives a major migration decision but is not likely to be otherwise
correlated with credit demand or creditworthiness. To the extent that migrants who
move for this exogenous reason receive less credit, this effect represents an economic
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inefficiency in the sense that these individuals would receive loans if lenders could
distinguish the reasons for their prior migration.
Testing this theory requires an appropriate institutional context in which en-
forcement of credit contracts is very weak and information-sharing among lenders
is limited and geographically concentrated. The situation in Guatemala in 2000 fits
these features well. An assessment of the Guatemalan legal environment for credit
transactions in the early 2000’s found that obtaining judicial rulings on security in-
terests took 1.5 to 2 years, on average (USAID 2004). Judicial mechanisms were also
“susceptible to dilatory practices, including the interposition of amparo remedies2 by
debtors alleging that their constitutional rights have been violated” (USAID 2004).
Similarly, excessive delays were frequent and formalistic requirements were regarded
as conducive to corruption (USAID 2004). Even once rulings had been reached,
there were no bailiffs or other private or public entities to enforce the rulings, and
creditors at times resorted to extrajudicial enforcement, including vandalism, illegal
repossession and similar mechanisms. These were perceived as costly substitutes for
efficient judicial enforcement (USAID 2004).
The costliness and difficulty of contract enforcement in Guatemala led to the
development of information-based alternatives to compel borrowers to repay loans.
As previously mentioned, TransUnion launched the first private credit bureau in
the country in 2001. In 2002, CREDIREF was founded as a credit bureau primarily
serving hundreds of micro-finance institutions and credit cooperatives, in addition to
2The amparo judicial procedure is intended to protect constitutional rights, but the lack of
control against frivolous claims has led to abuses of this method (USAID 2004).
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at least two major banks (de Janvry et al 2003). Other collaborative efforts among
MFIs have been undertaken more recently. However, these information-sharing
efforts were not formalized or offered on a national basis in 2000. Any information-
sharing taking place in 2000, therefore, was likely to be through informal exchanges
among loan officers or individual bank branches in particular geographic locations.
In this empirical analysis, it is important to distinguish “access to credit”
from the observed use of credit, as non-users of financial services often choose not
to take out loans because they have no need for them (“voluntary self-exclusion,”
World Bank (2008)). I focus on access to formal credit in terms of traditional credit
rationing, wherein lenders choose not to provide credit to some individuals even
though these potential borrowers may be willing to pay the equilibrium interest rate
(“involuntary exclusion”). Although I observe whether an individual reports having
applied for a loan and whether she received it, there are strong reasons to believe
that many individuals correctly expected to have their loan applications rejected
and thus never applied. As in La Ferrara (2003), I instead begin by examining
whether migrants are less likely to have loans conditional on a variety of demand-
related characteristics, such as the individual’s age, education level, and general
poverty classification. That is, I condition the use of credit on a variety of factors
affecting the return to capital and interpret any residual effects of migration on credit
holdings as being related to lender supply decisions. I then relax this assumption by
examining whether migration affects the probability of applying for a loan, as well
as the probability of receiving it. This general approach is also akin to the extensive
empirical literature examining labor market discrimination, which assesses whether
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racial or gender variables significantly affect the component of wages unexplained by
characteristics typically associated with labor productivity (see Altonji and Blank
(1999) for a review).
The empirical relationship between individual migration and access to credit is
riddled with reverse causality and omitted variable issues. An individual could move
in part because she expects better access to credit in her destination, or she could
be more entrepreneurial than her peers and thus less averse both to moving and to
taking out a loan. Both of these reverse causality and omitted variable bias issues
could lead to a positive relationship between migration and credit, confounding any
actual rationing of loans to migrants. If we simply test the relationship between
migration and credit access in an ordinary least squares (OLS) regression, it might
not be surprising were we to find no statistically meaningful relationship, given these
confounding factors. I therefore adopt an instrumental variables (IV) approach to
identify the causal effect of migration on credit supply by focusing specifically on
those factors that affect migration but (1) are not observed by potential lenders
and thus cannot directly affect the supply of credit to an individual, and (2) are
uncorrelated with individual unobservables that may be correlated with loan demand
or lender perceptions of creditworthiness.
As previously noted, evidence on migration patterns in Guatemala suggests
that a substantial portion of migration can be explained by the rate of violence in
one’s birthplace. The Guatemala LSMS survey is well-suited to study this effect
because it specifically includes questions that allow me to determine which indi-
viduals are most likely to be sensitive to violence or crime in their local area. If
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some individuals are particularly sensitive to these issues (relative to the average
individual in their community), they may be more likely to migrate away from vio-
lent and crime-ridden areas than would less sensitive individuals or those born into
less violent areas. The LSMS includes a module on social capital in which individ-
ual respondents are asked what they perceive to be the most challenging problems
facing their local communities; crime, violence, and drug and alcohol addiction are
among the possible choices. Lenders are unlikely to know how sensitive to such
issues a potential borrower may be (conditional on the borrower’s other character-
istics). Moreover, in the LSMS, individuals are asked whether they themselves have
directly experienced a variety of crimes or acts of violence in the previous year.
Controlling for an individual’s actual experience–which may be an outcome of mi-
grant status or correlated with other unobservable characteristics–also allows me to
focus specifically on a person’s perceptions of violence not related to her underlying
income-generating capabilities or creditworthiness.
Nonetheless, there are several reasons why this sensitivity may not serve as
a valid instrument for migration propensity. First, such sensitivity could be corre-
lated with other individual-level unobservables, such as risk aversion or other en-
trepreneurial attitudes. If this is the case, this sensitivity may in fact be correlated
with an individual’s demand for credit and thus directly affect her credit holdings
independently of any migration-related effects (violating the exclusion restriction).
Second, the effect of this sensitivity need not be uniform given the relative variation
in actual violence rates across different locations. If certain areas of the country are
particularly violence-ridden, we may expect to see a much stronger out-migration
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response for particularly sensitive individuals born into these areas than from those
where violence and crime are much less prevalent. Imposing a uniform response by
examining the average effect of sensitivity to crime across the sample may mask the
role played by this sensitivity.
To address these issues, I utilize the interaction of one’s sensitivity to crime
with the level of actual violence and crime in an individual’s birthplace as my in-
strument. Using this interaction allows me to control for the direct effects of being
sensitive to violence on credit holdings, highlighted as potentially problematic in
the first point above, as well as the direct effect of one’s birthplace3. The first stage
regression assessing migration propensity is the following:
Mijk = (Sensijk ∗Dangerj)α +Xijkβ + Sensijkγ + Experienceijkλ+ δj + ηk + εijk
(3.1)
where Mijk is the out-migration decision of individual i born into location j and
currently residing in k, Sensijk is person i’s sensitivity to violence or crime, Dangerj
is the average likelihood of experiencing violence or crime across all individuals in
location j, Xijk are other individual controls, Experienceijk is a dummy variable
indicating whether a household has experienced violence or crime, and δj and ηk are
fixed effects for birth and current locations4.
3My identifying assumption is that the effects on credit holdings of any other unobserved char-
acteristics correlated with sensitivity do not vary by the relative level of violence in an individual’s
birthplace.
4There are several reasons why the estimate of α in 3.1 is likely a lower bound of the true
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To capture the threat of danger in each person’s birthplace, I use the average
probability of experiencing violence or crime in each location. Why not simply use
each individual’s actual experience with violence or crime to explain subsequent
migration decisions? First, the LSMS questions on conflict experienced refer to the
previous 12 months, after most of the migration decisions I observe in the sample
were made. Second, an individual’s expectation of being victimized may be informed
not only by her own experience but by the experience of the broader set of people
in the community. In fact, individuals who reside in a crime-ridden area but have
not themselves been victimized may indeed be quite fearful about their likelihood
of becoming crime victims. Thus, I use the average level of violence and crime in
one’s birthplace in constructing the instrument for migration.
This approach raises a separate issue: although high violence rates in their
birthplaces may indeed drive individuals to leave, they may also be correlated with
other unobserved characteristics shared by individuals born in these locations. Es-
timation using location-level averages to explain individual-level outcomes can par-
ticularly suffer from such a “reflection problem” (Manski (1993)). I follow Bertrand,
Luttmer and Mullainathan (2000), who address this problem in the context of their
estimation of the social effects of welfare receipt by using heterogeneity in the im-
pact of the network to identify its effects. I adopt a similar heterogeneity-based
approach, adapting it to an IV setting where the heterogeneous social effects are
effect of violence on migration. First, I am not estimating the direct effect of location-level dan-
ger, only the differential effect on those particularly sensitive to such danger. Second, since an
individual’s actual experience may be a result of her migration decision, λ may suffer from reverse
causation/simultaneity problems and may capture some of the effects of α. Nonetheless, my focus
is on identifying an exogenous source of variation and not assessing the total effect of the average
violence in a location on individual migration decisions.
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used as instrument for migration and can be reasonably assumed not to directly
affect individuals’ credit holdings.
To do so, I control for the direct effects of being born into a particularly
dangerous location by using locational fixed effects, thus eliminating the effects of
any other unobserved characteristics shared by those born in this location. I thus
utilize only the effects of being particularly sensitive to danger among those born into
dangerous locations as my exogenous source of variation in migration propensity.
This requires assuming that the unobserved common locational characteristics do
not vary in their impacts on migration in the same way as does sensitivity to violence
or crime5.
My primary estimation uses linear probability models, as these are compu-
tationally straightforward in a two-stage least squares setting. The equations I
estimate are the following:
Lijk = Mijkθ +Xijkφ+ Sensijkϕ+ Experienceijkµ+ νj + ρk + υijk (3.2)
Mijk = (Sensijk ∗Dangerj)α +Xijkβ + Sensijkγ + Experienceijkλ+ δj + ηk + εijk
where Lijk is a dummy variable indicating whether the individual has a loan
from a bank or cooperative. The exclusion restriction I assume is:
5Such a heterogeneous effects approach is particularly appropriate for an IV estimation because
our interest is in isolating an exogenous component of migration and not necessarily in estimating
the full scale of the social effects.
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E((Sensijk ∗Dangerj) ∗ υijk|Xijk, Sensijk, Experienceijk, Dj, Dk) = 0 (3.3)
where Dj and Dk are dummy variables indicating an individual’s birth and
current departments. That is, the interaction of an individual’s sensitivity to crime
and birth in a particularly violent area affects the likelihood of having a loan only
through its effects on migration (conditional on the individual’s other characteris-
tics). In section 3.8, I construct an indirect test of the validity of this restriction.
3.5 Data
I use the Encuesta Nacional Sobre Condiciones de Vida (a World Bank-
supported LSMS) conducted in 2000 throughout Guatemala, which surveyed in-
dividuals in 7,276 households. Guatemala is divided into 22 departments and 332
municipalities. The survey includes questions detailing in which municipality an
individual was born, where she resided five years earlier, and how long she has lived
in her current municipality. I primarily focus on inter-department migration over
a person’s adult lifetime by comparing her birthplace with her current residence6.
Because long-term migration is often a household decision, I limit the sample to
household heads. Moreover, a number of small departments had relatively few peo-
ple surveyed and did not have any individuals who listed violence or crime as the
6Naturally, this approach does not address phenomena of return and seasonal migration, but is
consistent with previous analyses of migration patterns within Guatemala (Micklin (1990); Morri-
son (1993)). In addition, for this analysis, I use information on the number of years an individual
has lived in her current location to label individuals who moved before they were 18 as non-migrants
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major issue there (discussed below). I eliminate these individuals from my estima-
tion sample because the fixed effects estimation perfectly predicts their sensitivity
to crime. Doing so reduces the sample to 6,843 household heads. More than 24%
of these individuals migrated across departments sometime in their lives, with ap-
proximately 16% having migrated to their current department in the previous 10
years.
As previously discussed, the Guatemala LSMS includes a social capital module
that asked respondents, “In your opinion, what are the two principal problems in this
community that you consider should be resolved in an urgent fashion?”. Individuals
can respond by choosing from among a list of categories, including: unemployment,
lack of health services, lack of education services, violence, crime, insecurity, drug
addiction, alcoholism, corruption, high costs of living, too much trash, growing social
differences, disintegration of the society and the family, etc. Approximately 7.6% of
the household heads listed violence or crime among the two most urgent problems.
The module also asks about individual experiences with conflict, such as whether
the respondent has been a victim of assault, robbery, vandalism, land conflict, or
other violence in the previous 12 months. Using this component, I can condition an
individual’s perceived importance of violence or crime on her experiences, as well as
other covariates.
Of course, this data relates to each individual’s current perceptions, and these
sensitivities may vary over a person’s lifetime. Our assumption is that conditioning
on age and other factors suitably generates a measure of each individual’s long-term
personality characteristics. I de-mean the sensitivity variable by regressing it on
72
an individual’s current and birthplace departments and all of the other controls
(including the actual violence experienced by each individual). I base my measure
of individual sensitivity on the residual of this estimation, creating a categorical
variable denoting the top half of the individuals as “high sensitivity” and the bottom
half “low sensitivity.” It is this high sensitivity measure that enters the regression
above in both the direct and interaction terms. I make this adjustment because,
in the first stage equation (3.1), the interaction term is a non-linear function of
the sensitivity and thus one cannot control for the average sensitivity by simply
using a linear dummy term for each location in the same equation7. I adopt this
approach because it provides an intuitive interpretation in the 2SLS framework.
Alternatively, one can directly include the interactions of the covariates with birth
in a dangerous location directly in the 2SLS specification, but doing so complicates
the interpretation of most of these covariates, which would enter in both stages. In
section 3.8, I check that the approach I use–which involves a preliminary estimation–
does not create an error-in-variables problem by bootstrapping the full estimation.
I also use the responses to the question about victimization in the previous
12 months to construct the share of individuals who have been victimized at the
department level, using the survey’s sampling weights to reflect the mean rates in
the population. In order to assess the effect of violence and crime on a person’s
out-migration decision, it would be optimal to have time-varying data on the vic-
timization rates to better match them to each person’s birth or age. In the absence
7Sensitivity to violence or crime is partly a function of where one is born and where one currently
resides, as well as other covariates. The interaction of this sensitivity and birth in a dangerous
location is a non-linear function of birth and current department dummies and other covariates.
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of this data, I use the current violence rates from each individual’s birth depart-
ment, focusing on the rank order of the departments, which is more likely to remain
relatively constant over time. In particular, I generate a dummy variable indicat-
ing whether an individual’s birth department is among the top four most violent
departments (i.e., Guatemala City, Sacatepequez, Chimaltenango, and Escuintla).
Approximately 24% of the household heads were born in one of these departments.
It is the interaction of this dummy variable and the individual’s sensitivity to vio-
lence that serves as the primary instrument.
The credit section of the LSMS includes a variety of information on a house-
hold’s current loan holdings. Only approximately 10% of household heads held loans
of any type (the share is slightly higher if I consider all loans held by household mem-
bers, not just its head). These loans were provided by a variety of sources, with
22% coming from banks (both private and state), 15% from cooperatives, 13% from
individual moneylenders, and 25% from relatives or friends. I focus the analysis on
the probability of having a loan from a bank or cooperative, as these are the main
sources of formal credit. Most of the loans from all sources had been held for less
than one year, and many had relatively short-term repayment schedules typical of
developing country contexts.
Finally, other individual characteristics used as covariates include the indi-
vidual’s age, highest education level attained, gender, ethnicity, primary language,
general poverty level, and household size, among others. Summary statistics are




Table 3.2 presents the first stage estimation of migration determinants. The
first column shows the conditioning of one’s sensitivity to violence or crime on the
set of covariates. Department fixed effects are included for each individual’s current
residence and birthplace, controlling for the mean perception of violence among in-
dividuals born and currently living in each location. Standard errors are corrected
for correlation among individuals within each municipality. Not surprisingly, indi-
viduals who had actually experienced conflict in the previous 12 months were more
likely to rate violence as a key issue in the local community. Women and those
less poor were also significantly more likely to cite violence or crime among the top
issues.
As previously noted, the residual of this regression is grouped into two cate-
gories, indicating high and low sensitivity to violence or crime. I create a dummy
variable, Sensitivity to violence or crime, which takes on a value of one for those in
the high group and zero for those in the low group. In the second column, I regress
migrant status on this sensitivity, as well as its interaction with the indicator for
birth in a particularly violence-ridden area. Once again, I include dummies for both
departments of current residence and departments of birth to control for common
unobserved characteristics among individuals living and born in each area. Notably,
migration is significantly driven by both one’s sensitivity to violence and the in-
teraction of this sensitivity with actual violence indicators at the department level,
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with both coefficients being large, positive, and highly significant. Being older, less
poor, and male is also significantly associated with having migrated during one’s
lifetime.
Moreover, each individual’s actual crime experience does not directly affect
migration. This result is particularly important because if migrants are more likely
to be targeted for crime or violence in their new locations, we might be concerned
that one’s sensitivity to crime changes after migration. If this were the case, we
would expect to see an effect of experience with violence on migration due to reverse
causation; we do not find this result, suggesting that migration likely does not
endogenously affect our measure of sensitivity to violence.
One of this study’s main aims is the identification of an exogenous, one-time
motive for migration. That is, after a person who is particularly sensitive to violence
or crime moves away from her particularly dangerous birthplace, she should be
much less likely to move again. This would be the case if most of highly sensitive
migrants born into dangerous locations move to less dangerous locations. Once a
highly sensitive individual has moved to a less dangerous location, her motive for
further migration would be substantially reduced.
Table 3.3 confirms that the instrument I construct does indeed identify such
migration patterns. I limit the sample to individuals who were born into the most
dangerous departments and who migrated away from them. Among these migrants,
we find stark differences in the danger level of their destinations based on the indi-
vidual’s sensitivity to such danger. 75% of low sensitivity individuals move to other
dangerous locations, while only 39% of highly sensitive individuals do so. The large
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difference between these probabilities is statistically significant at the 99.9% level.
These findings provide evidence that migration among highly sensitive individuals
born into dangerous locations is not likely to be a recurring phenomenon.
3.6.2 Second Stage
I next turn to the question of whether these migration determinants lead to
worse credit access. Column 1 of Table 3.4 shows an OLS regression of credit (specif-
ically, a dummy for having a loan from a bank or cooperative) on migration status as
well as other covariates. In this estimation, the effect of being a migrant is negative,
but the coefficient is statistically insignificant at any reasonable level. As previously
mentioned, this is not entirely surprising, given the confounding effects of reverse
causality and omitted variables noted earlier. Other covariates have the expected
signs and are largely significant. Older, wealthier and better educated individuals
are more likely to have loans, as are men and those with larger households.
Column 2 shows the reduced form (OLS) regression of credit on our main
instrument. We find that an individual who is sensitive to violence or crime and
is born into a particularly dangerous department is approximately 3.6% less likely
to have a loan than an equally sensitive person born into a less dangerous area.
This interaction effect is significant at the 95% confidence level. Interestingly, the
direct effect of a person’s sensitivity is actually slightly positive but not significant.
Nonetheless, the interaction term is large enough so that when combining the direct
and interaction terms, we find that being sensitive to violence and being born into
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a dangerous locale leads to a 2% reduction in the likelihood of having a loan. The
coefficients on the other covariates are largely unchanged from Column 1.
Column 3 of Table 3.4 presents the results of our primary 2SLS specification
(see Eq. 3.2 and 3.1). Most notably, the coefficient on being a migrant is negative,
significant, and quite large, suggesting that migration leads to a 12.5% drop in a
person’s likelihood of gaining access to credit. This much larger and more significant
effect (relative to the OLS estimate in Column 1) is probably due to the elimination
of confounding reverse causality effects present in the OLS setting. There are several
other factors supporting this estimate. First, the coefficients on the poverty ratings
are substantially higher in the 2SLS setting. In both our sample and in other
evidence (Morrison 1993), migration in Guatemala is highly positively correlated
with wealth levels8. It is thus likely that the OLS and reduced form coefficients
on the poverty groupings are confounded by the correlated and negative effects of
migration.
The second factor supporting the estimated magnitude of the effect of migra-
tion is the relatively strong first stage. The instrument is quite “relevant,” and
its large first stage coefficient (0.29) and t-statistic (6.14) suggest that the second
stage should not suffer from bias due to “weak instrument” problems highlighted
by Bound, Jaeger, and Baker (1995) and Staiger and Stock (1997). Moreover, com-
paring the magnitude of the first stage coefficient on the interaction of sensitivity
and birth in a dangerous department with the second stage coefficient on migra-
8Although migrants may be relatively less well-off than natives in their destinations, they are
generally better off than natives in their birth departments.
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tion (-0.125), we find that much of the reduced form effect of this interaction on
migration (-0.0357) is due to the first stage relationship. That is, the first stage
robustly identifies migration propensity, which would support the identification of
even a relatively weaker relationship between migration and credit access.
I also consider whether the effects I detect on the probability that an individ-
ual has a loan truly reflect lender decisions rather than lower loan demand among
migrants. One possibility may be that the demographic controls included in the
estimation do not sufficiently control for loan demand. To address this possibility, I
examine whether being migrant leads to a lower probability of applying for a loan,
as well as whether migrants are less likely to be approved, conditional on having
applied for a loan. Unfortunately, the LSMS only asks whether anyone in the house-
hold has applied for a loan in cash, presumably from any source, in the previous 12
months. We can surmise that most of these applicantions were to formal sources
rather than informal, as the latter generally do not have application processes.9
The results, shown in Table 3.5, are striking. As the first column of Table 3.5
shows, being a migrant does not cause an individual to be less likely to apply for a
loan (The coefficient on being a migrant is 0.045, with a t-statistic of 0.52). When
one examines the subsample of 914 individuals who applied for a loan, however, one
finds a large and significant negative effect of being a migrant on the probability of
9Approximately 1% of the total sample of individuals cited not having applied for loans but
nonetheless hold loans from formal sources. I consider these individuals to be applicants, bringing
the share of individuals who applied for loans to approximately 13%. Moreover, as discussed
earlier, it is also likely that at least some individuals correctly anticipated that they would be
rationed and thus never applied for loans in the first place. Thus, to the extent we find an effect
of being a migrant on loan holdings conditional on observed applications, we can surmise that this
is a lower bound of the full effect of credit rationing, which would include those individuals who
would otherwise be induced to apply for loans.
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holding a loan. As shown in the second column of Table 3.5, conditional on applying
for a loan, migrants are 78% less likely to actually hold a loan from a formal source.
The other covariates retain the same signs as in the full specification. These results
support my empirical strategy, which identifies the effects of migration on lender
decisions rather than on loan demand.
3.7 Alternative Explanations
I next assess whether the primary findings could be driven by alternative
explanations rather than our main claim that weak contract enforcement and infor-
mation sharing led to greater rationing of loans to migrants. In particular, I examine
whether moral hazard, adverse selection, or omitted variables such as social capital
are the primary causes leading us to observe fewer loans to migrants.
3.7.1 Moral Hazard
As previously noted, credit rationing has often been linked to issues of involun-
tary default due to informational asymmetries. A notable example is moral hazard,
which could particularly affect migrants if there is greater uncertainty about their
actions or production choices. Informal lenders often rely on social mechanisms to
monitor individuals’ behavior. If moral hazard is the core factor causing rationing
of loans to migrants, informal lenders would be particularly susceptible to this issue.
Banks and other formal lenders, on the other hand, may not find social monitoring of
moral hazard as crucial in their lending policies toward migrants. I therefore assess
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whether rationing of loans to migrants is particularly heightened among informal
lenders relative to formal lenders. Table 3.6 shows the results of running the 2SLS
estimation while considering dependent variables capturing different loan sources.
In column 1, I include the primary variable indicating whether an individual has a
loan from a bank (private or public) or a cooperative. In column 2, I use a similar
variable denoting whether she has a loan from a family member, friend, or individ-
ual. Notably, I find almost no effect of migration on informal lending (column 2),
suggesting that moral hazard is unlikely to be driving the phenomenon of reduced
lending to migrants.
3.7.2 Adverse Selection
Rationing due to involuntary default could also be driven by adverse selec-
tion issues. A credit market could exhibit greater rationing of loans to migrants if
lenders “know less” about individual migrants’ expected returns than they do about
individual natives. As previously noted in Section 3.2, different risk formulations
have been shown to lead to over-lending rather than rationing, and the equilibrium
outcome under adverse selection depends on the distributions of the different param-
eters. Nonetheless, I examine whether the main effect of being a migrant on credit
is driven by lender uncertainty about a borrower’s income. All else equal, poten-
tial borrowers whose income comes primarily from less formal or verifiable sources
should be less likely to receive loans. The LSMS includes detailed information on
income sources; I calculate the share coming from “other sources,” composed of
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transfers from other community members and organizations (primarily churches),
as well as remittances from both other parts of the country and from abroad. This
calculation excludes government transfers for retirees, orphans, and those receiving
food support.
From a lender’s perspective, these “other sources” of income are likely to be
less verifiable or more opaque than labor income or government transfers. Other
factors may also affect a lender’s uncertainty about a potential borrower’s income,
including the underlying volatility in the person’s labor income. Nonetheless, if
the opacity of an individual’s income matters, we should observe greater rationing
among individuals with larger shares of relatively opaque income. If migrant status
is in fact proxying for greater income opacity, including the share of income from less
verifiable sources (while controlling for the total level of income) should reduce the
negative coefficient on migrant status. As Table 3.7 shows, having a greater share of
income come from these “other sources” does reduce the likelihood of having a loan,
but this does not reduce the effect of being a migrant, which remains large and
statistically significant. Total individual income does raise a person’s probability
of being a migrant, as well as the probability that she has a loan, but this effect
is not statistically significant10. Nonetheless, adverse selection due to the opacity
of a borrower’s income, here captured by the share of income from relatively less
verifiable sources, does not appear to explain credit rationing to migrants.
10In other specifications not shown, I include higher order polynomials of income to ensure that
the pure income effect of community support and remittances is being adequately controlled for.
These do not affect the results.
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3.7.3 Omitted Variables: Social Capital
As discussed in the introduction, migration may have both positive and nega-
tive associations with access to credit. In fact, migration is typically seen as indica-
tive of positive unobservable characteristics, such as an entreprenreurial personality.
If lenders hold this belief, they may be more likely to extend credit to migrants than
to others because their migration status could proxy for these positive characteris-
tics. Nonetheless, there may be omitted variables that are correlated with migration
status and lower credit demand or supply. One such possibility is an individual’s
social capital: A person with few social connections may be more likely to move
than one with more connections, and the sparsity of these connections could cause
her to have less demand for credit (or fewer possible co-signers for loans).
The LSMS Social Capital module asks whether any individuals in the house-
hold have participated in a variety of collective action, solidarity, or other social
activities over the past year. I use the number of activities listed by the respondent
(out of a maximum of 13) as a primary measure of the household’s social capital.
Of course, the timing of this measure is not ideal, as it may reflect post-migration
conditions rather than the social capital the individual had in her origin region.
Nonetheless, as with our measure of sensitivity to violence, conditioning on a set
of individual characteristics and department means should eliminate some of the
lifecycle and migration-related variation. Table 3.8 shows the first and second stage
regressions including this measure of social capital as a covariate. As expected,
having greater social capital is associated with a lower migration propensity, as
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well as with greater access to credit. However, neither the first stage coefficient on
our instrument nor the second stage coefficient on migration vary substantially in
magnitude or statistical significance from our base specifications.
3.7.4 Urban-Rural Migration
Another alternative explanation of the results may be that the instrument I use
explains specific migration paths particularly well. For example, one might suspect
that individuals who are particularly concerned about violence and crime and who
are born into particularly dangerous locations may be more likely to move to rural
areas, where the threat of violence and crime may be somewhat lower and credit
demand may be lower. There are several reasons that such differential migration
paths are not likely to drive the results. Table 3.9 shows that this is not the case.
Individuals for whom Sensijk ∗Dangerj = 1 are in fact no more likely to reside in
a rural location than those individuals for whom the instrument = 0.
3.8 Robustness Checks
I next assess whether the main results are robust to a number of potential
econometric issues: estimator uncertainty, exclusion restriction issues, sampling
weight heterogeneity and endogenous covariates. The primary results largely survive
this series of sensitivity checks.
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3.8.1 Estimator Uncertainty
Given that I have added a preliminary stage to my estimation procedure,
in which I residualize each individual’s sensitivity to local violence or crime on
her demographic characteristics, my primary 2SLS estimation could be subject to
greater uncertainty than implied by conventional standard errors. That is, the
standard errors calculated in the main estimation do not incorporate the additional
uncertainty due to the measurement error in one of the key explanatory variables. To
address this, I bootstrap the entire estimation procedure, including the demeaning
of the sensitivity variable, using 192 resampling iterations. Table 3.10 compares
the results of this bootstrapping to the unadjusted results. The coefficients and
t-statistics remain similar, and it is clear that bootstrapping does not substantially
alter the main findings.
3.8.2 Exclusion Restriction
Given that I utilize a just-identified IV approach, one may reasonably raise
concerns over the validity of the exclusion restriction, which cannot be tested in the
same manner as in an over-identified estimation. One reason for concern may be that
using an interaction term as an instrument could render my estimates susceptible
to nonlinearities in the effects of the individual variables. Although I address the
issue of unobserved demand factors in section 3.6, this section checks that model
misspecification in its treatment of demand does not lead to a violation of the
exclusion restriction. As an example, consider the following model:
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Lijk = Dijk ∗ Sijk + εijk (3.4)
Dijk = α1 + α2Sensijk + α3Xijk + α4Dangeri + α5νj + α6ρk (3.5)
Sijk = β1 + β2Dangerj + β3Mijk + β4Xijk + β5Dangeri + β6ηk (3.6)
where Dijk is the probability of individual i born in j and currently living in k ap-
plying for a loan, and Sijk is the probability of a lender approving a loan conditional
on an individual applying. Here, a person’s sensitivity to local violence affects her
demand for loans. Moreover, lenders know and use the danger level of a person’s
birthplace as a factor in approving her loan. In this model, having a loan is a non-
linear function of these variables. In this case, we can re-write this model as the
following:
Lijk = α1β1 + α1β2Dangerj + α1β3Mijk + ...+ α2β2Sensijk ∗Dangerj + ...
(3.7)
In this model, being a migrant may affect whether we observe her holding any
loans (i.e., if α1β3 > 0). However, we may not be able to use the main instrument
(Sensijk ∗Dangerj) in an IV estimation because it may directly enter into the main
regression (i.e. if α2β2 > 0). Moreover, one cannot directly test this condition,
as the resulting specification would be indistinguishable from my existing reduced
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form specification. I can, however, assess whether α1β2 > 0. More intuitively, this is
akin to testing whether, under this alternative model, lenders do differentiate their
borrowers based on the danger level in individuals’ birthplaces (i.e., β2 > 0) . It
offers an indirect test of the exclusion restriction.
To implement this test, I re-estimate the reduced form specification and test
whether the fixed effects for each of the four most dangerous birth departments
are jointly significant. The p-value on this F-test is only 0.381, suggesting that
individuals from these departments do not appear to be differentially affected. In
other words, there is no direct effect of being born in a dangerous location on the
probability of holding a loan. As such, we can be more confident that the effect of
birthplace danger on credit occurs through the migration decision and not through
a non-linear interaction of demand and supply decisions.
Finally, as one additional specification check, I assess whether there is any
evidence that interaction terms between Sensijk or Dangerj and any of the other
covariates enter into the main regression. To do so, I sequentially include the inter-
actions of Sensijk with Xijk in the second stage regression, as well as the interactions
of Dangerj and Xijk (Xijk includes age, age squared, household size, gender, poverty
rating, education level dummies, and ethnicity dummies). Notably, none of these
interaction terms yields a significant coefficient11. Thus, even if one believes that
Sensijk or Dangerj enter the main regression non-linearly, the higher-order terms
of these variables are not correlated with any of the covariates. It seems relatively
11When all of the interactions are included jointly in one main regression, the F-statistic testing
whether they are jointly different from zero is 1.48 and not significant.
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improbable that the interaction of Sensijk and Dangerj is the only interaction that
is correlated with the higher-order terms of either of these variables.
3.8.3 Sampling Weights
Complex survey designs often lead some individuals or households to be in-
cluded in a sample with greater probability than would be the case in pure random
sampling. Whether one should account for this nonrandom sampling in regressions
depends on the goals and nature of the estimation: If the primary purpose is descrip-
tive, such as examining the mean of one variable conditional on others, or if one is
interested in making inferences about the full population, sampling weights should
be incorporated (Deaton 1997). However, if, as in my case, the purpose of the re-
gression is limited to assessing variable relationships within the sample, the issue of
survey design is primarily one of heterogeneity in the effects (whether the effects are
correlated with the sampling weights). As Deaton (1997) notes, the classic econo-
metric argument against the weighted estimator is that it will be less efficient and
have larger standard errors than the unweighted estimator when the strata are not
homogenous, while it will not necessarily be superior in terms of consistency. Thus,
I first compare the unweighted and weighted estimators in Table 3.11, finding that
the weighted estimator does change the coefficients somewhat, but also increases
the standard errors. Therefore, following Deaton (1997), I conduct a Hausman-type
specification test assessing whether the key effects vary with the sampling weights.
That is, I estimate the following reduced form specification:
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Lijk = (Sensijk ∗ V iolencej)α +W ∗ (Sensijk ∗ V iolencej)ψ + Sensijkγ +W ∗ Sensijkς
+V iolenceiλ+Xiβ + δj + ηk + εijk
where W is the matrix of sampling weights. Table 3.12 presents these results. One
can use an F-statistic to test the null hypothesis that [ψ, ς] = [0, 0], obtaining a
p-value of 0.81. Given the aforementioned efficiency tradeoff in using the weighted
estimator, I continue to rely on the unweighted estimator as my preferred specifica-
tion.
3.8.4 Endogenous Covariates
Although my primary instrumental variable estimation addresses the reverse
causality of credit’s effects on migration, it includes a number of control variables
that may also endogenously affect migration. It is important to include these control
variables because they may otherwise confound the effect of migration; if individ-
uals who migrate are less poor and poverty is negatively associated with access to
credit (as is the case in Guatemala), not including some measure of poverty in the
estimation would bias the estimated effect of migration on credit upwards. I assess
the extent to which any one of these endogenously determined covariates affects the
primary results by sequentially dropping each covariate from the 2SLS regression.
The results, presented in Table 3.13, suggest that omitting the household’s size and
experience with crime does not appear to substantially alter the results. Dropping
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the household head’s education level and the household’s poverty status from the
regressions does reduce the magnitude of the “migrant” effect, though not dramat-
ically enough to suggest that endogeneity in either of these variables is likely to be
driving my baseline results. Moreover, these variables are likely to be positively cor-
related with a household’s ability to migrate, and their inclusion in the regressions
is exactly intended to address the confounding effects of pre-migration wealth on
post-migration access to credit.
3.9 Conclusions
My theoretical model illustrates that migrants who move because of a random
shock can experience credit rationing, even if these migrants would choose to stay
in their new locations and repay their loans. This model is consistent with empirical
results suggesting that migrants who move for reasons that are uncorrelated with
credit demand or creditworthiness are nonetheless substantially less likely to receive
credit from formal lenders. I find that migrants are 12.5% less likely to have a loan
and 78% less likely to receive one conditional on applying for a loan.
To confirm that weak contract enforcement is the primary cause of this ra-
tioning, I tested several alternative explanations. As these migrants do not expe-
rience rationing from informal sources, it is unlikely that moral hazard is driving
my baseline result. Moreover, as the share of income from less verifiable and more
volatile sources does not affect the migrant “penalty,” adverse selection based on
opacity of income does not appear to drive this differential treatment of migrants,
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nor do social capital deficiencies or softer credit demand among migrants. Thus,
migration leads some individuals to receive fewer loans because lenders are con-
cerned about their tendency for strategic default and the signal they may send to
future migrants. If lenders could distinguish the reasons for prior migration, they
would be more likely to extend credit to individuals who are especially sensitive to
local violence and who have moved to get away from their particularly dangerous
birthplaces rather than to escape loan repayment commitments.
This paper adopts a quasi-experimental strategy to identify the effect of in-
dividual migration on access to credit, using the broad thematic coverage of the
World Bank LSMS to observe a key migration factor that is not directly observed
by lenders. This approach certainly has limitations, among them the reliance on
a just-identified estimation that does not easily lend itself to tests of the exclu-
sion restriction. However, the quasi-experimental approach allows me to study a
compelling real-world context in which large numbers of people have been affected.
Indeed, migration represents a major discrete event in many people’s lives, which
makes it difficult to study in an experimental or randomized control trial setting.
Nonetheless, studying its impacts is crucial in light of ongoing research identify-
ing the importance of civil liberties–particularly residential freedom–to economic
growth and the development of complex markets, such as finance (BenYishay and
Betancourt 2009). In this paper, I find that migration causes a substantial reduc-
tion in access to credit, highlighting an important friction that can partly dissipate
broader gains in productivity and human capital that would otherwise result from
labor mobility, as migration obscures the information structure and thus prevents
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creditworthy individuals from obtaining loans. In developing countries, support-
ing robust credit information sharing institutions may be one way to minimize this
friction. In addition, using quasi-experimental methods to study the impacts of mi-
gration represents an area of overlap between divergent approaches in contemporary
development economics, linking an issue with macroeconomic implications with the
methodological imperative for rigorous exogeneity (as argued by Abhijit Banerjee
in The Economist (2008)).
Strengthening contract enforcement and creditor rights poses challenges. Even
in the context of weak enforcement of debt contracts, information sharing among
lenders can be used to incentivize borrowers to repay their loans. In 2001, with the
support of the World Bank Group, TransUnion opened the first credit bureau in
Guatemala. Nonetheless, as of 2007, only approximately 13% of the country’s adult
population was covered by the bureau (as reported by the IFC’s Doing Business
website). New investments in information sharing infrastructure in other develop-
ing countries are being pursued with similar fanfare, but the implementation of
these systems remains uneven and challenging. This research suggests that further
attention by policymakers should be devoted to the design and implementation of
these systems.
This work also highlights migrants as a unique set of potential borrowers who
are particularly opaque and thus are especially relevant for studying the extent of
informational problems in credit markets. One channel through which this opacity
arises endogenously is that migration involves a severing of relationships with lenders
and other market participants, making migrants even more opaque relative to the
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average native. Further study may also examine how such informational problems
endogenously affect individual migration decisions, as individuals weigh migrating
to an attractive destination against the lower likelihood of obtaining a loan after
their migration. Such research could identify the impact of this reduced access to
credit on individuals’ incomes, consumption, and welfare.
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Table 3.1: Summary Statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Individual has loan from bank or coop-
erative
0.047 0.211 0 1
Migrant Across Dept As Adult 0.164 0.37 0 1
Violence or Crime Listed as Primary or
Secondary Local Problem
0.078 0.268 0 1
Born in One of Four Most Dangerous
Departments
0.248 0.432 0 1
High Sensitivity to Local Violence or
Crime * Birth in Dangerous Dept
0.053 0.224 0 1
Household Experienced Crime in Last
12 Months
0.142 0.349 0 1
Age 44.552 15.401 14 99
Household Size 5.198 2.515 1 18
Female 0.178 0.382 0 1
Poverty Rating 2 (Poor) 0.355 0.478 0 1
Poverty Rating 3 (Not Poor) 0.54 0.498 0 1
Total Individual Income (Monthly,
’000s of Quetzales)
1.53 9.18 0 500
Highest Level of Ed = Primary 0.448 0.497 0 1
Highest Level of Ed = Middle 0.145 0.353 0 1
Highest Level of Ed = Secondary 0.051 0.219 0 1
Highest Level of Ed = Post-Secondary 0.005 0.068 0 1
Highest Level of Ed = Adult Education 0.005 0.067 0 1
Kiche 0.067 0.25 0 1
Qeqchi 0.073 0.26 0 1
Kaqchikel 0.089 0.285 0 1
Mam 0.051 0.22 0 1
Other Maya 0.100 0.3 0 1
Garifuna 0.002 0.042 0 1
Xinka 0.003 0.054 0 1
Non-indigenous 0.615 0.487 0 1
Sample of 6843 household heads.  Omitted Poverty Rating is “Extremely Poor”.
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Table 3.2: First Stage





Estimation Type Probit OLS (First Stage)
High Sensitivity to Local Violence or Crime 0.2535***
(8.97)
High Sensitivity to Local Violence or Crime * 0.2859***
Birth in Dangerous Dept (6.14)
Household Experienced Crime 0.0338*** -0.0000
in Last 12 Months (5.03) (-0.00)
Age 0.0010 0.0055***
(1.16) (3.85)
Age Squared -0.0000 -0.0000**
(-0.87) (-2.84)
Household Size -0.0009 0.0030
(-0.75) (1.68)
Highest Level of Ed = Primary 0.0085 -0.0057
(1.29) (-0.66)
Highest Level of Ed = Middle 0.0483*** 0.0014
(4.75) (0.12)
Highest Level of Ed = Secondary 0.0387** -0.0035
(2.96) (-0.14)
Highest Level of Ed = Post-Secondary 0.0977** -0.5064***
(2.66) (-6.19)
Highest Level of Ed = Adult Education -0.0254 -0.0945
(-0.71) (-1.37)
Poverty Rating 2 (Poor) 0.0218 0.1631***
(1.36) (5.82)





Ethnic Group Dummies Y Y
Current Dept Dummies Y Y
Birth Dept Dummies Y Y
R2 . 0.45
Robust t statistics in parentheses. Errors clustered by municipality. *** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01,
* p < 0.05. Omitted Poverty Rating is “Extremely Poor”. The omitted ethnic group is Kiche;
included groups are Qeqchi, Kaqchikel, Mam, other Mayas, Garifuna, Xinka, and non-indigenous.
Table 3.3: Migration patterns of migrants born into one of most danger-
ous departments








 Sensitivity to Violence or Crime conditional on individual characteristics. *** denotes significance
at 0.1% confidence level
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Table 3.4: Access to Credit
Dependent Variable Individual Has Loan
Estimation Type OLS OLS 2SLS
(Reduced Form) (Second Stage)
Migrant Across Dept As Adult -0.0067 -0.1250*
(-0.83) (-2.18)
High Sens. to Violence or Crime 0.0157 0.0474*
(1.37) (1.99)
High Sens. to Violence or Crime * -0.0357*
Birth in Dangerous Dept (-2.19)
Household Experienced Crime -0.0122 -0.0124 -0.0124
in Last 12 Months (-1.54) (-1.56) (-1.55)
Age 0.0049*** 0.0049*** 0.0056***
(5.99) (6.02) (5.57)
Age Squared -0.0001*** -0.0001*** -0.0001***
(-6.46) (-6.51) (-6.00)
Household Size 0.0031* 0.0030* 0.0034*
(2.37) (2.29) (2.47)
Highest Level of Ed = Primary 0.0152** 0.0159** 0.0152**
(2.81) (2.96) (2.79)
Highest Level of Ed = Middle 0.0688*** 0.0690*** 0.0692***
(6.70) (6.72) (6.69)
Highest Level of Ed = Secondary 0.1265*** 0.1260*** 0.1255***
(5.26) (5.21) (4.99)
Highest Ed = Post-Secondary 0.1425 0.1537* 0.0905
(1.84) (1.99) (1.12)
Highest Ed = Adult Ed. 0.0314 0.0315 0.0197
(0.76) (0.78) (0.49)
Poverty Rating 2 (Poor) 0.0131 0.0175 0.0378**
(1.37) (1.94) (3.17)
Poverty Rating 3 (Not Poor) 0.0397*** 0.0438*** 0.0703***
(3.48) (3.92) (4.14)
Female -0.0177** -0.0175** -0.0203**
(-3.10) (-3.08) (-3.34)
Ethnic Group Dummies Y Y Y
Current Dept Dummies Y Y Y
Birth Dept Dummies Y Y Y
R2 0.05 0.05
Robust t statistics in parentheses. Errors clustered by municipality. *** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, *
p < 0.05.
 The reduced form regression examines the effects of the instrument on the main dependent






















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 3.9: Differences in Rural-Urban Migration?







































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Additional Results on Civil Liberties and Economic Development




Log of GDP Per Capita, 1995 8.00 1.03 6.16 10.25
Investment/GDP, Ave. over 1990s 13.12 7.00 2.90 42.18
Legal Formalism 3.91 1.16 1.58 6.01
Constraints on the Executive 4.79 1.75 1.18 7
CIM 0.82 0.18 0 1
Aggregate Civil Liberties Index 3.17 1.36 1 6
Freedom of Expression & Belief (D) 11.97 3.57 3 16
Associational & Organizational
Rights (E)
8.17 2.95 2 12
Rule of Law (F) 8.10 3.53 1 15
Personal Autonomy & Individual
Rights (G)
9.37 2.93 1 16
Electoral Process (A) 7.97 3.70 0 12
Political Pluralism & Participation
(B)
10.33 4.16 1 16
Functioning of Government (C) 6.50 3.02 0 12
Malaria Ecology 5.10 7.80 0 31.55
Landlocked Dummy 0.22 0.42 0 1
Latitude, Absolute Value 0.20 0.13 0 0.67






































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table A.4-A: OLS including OECD, dependent variable is log GDP per capita in
1995
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Legal Formalism -0.196* -0.298* -0.272** -0.235* -0.079 -0.074
(0.09) (0.12) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.07)









& Belief (D) <0.546>
Associational & 0.226***
Organ. Rights (E) (0.04)
<0.564>




& Indiv. Rights (G) (0.02)
<0.809>
Observations 83 83 83 83 83 83
R-Squared 0.469 0.153 0.367 0.385 0.476 0.684
Standard errors in parentheses and beta coefficients in brackets. *** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, *
p < 0.05.
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Table A.4-B: 2SLS using settler mortality
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Legal Formalism 0.054 0.275 0.284 0.751 0.924 0.195
(0.24) (0.30) (1.09) (1.45) (1.08) (0.19)









& Belief (D) <5.823>
Associational & 2.053
Organ. Rights (E) (2.34)
<5.684>




& Indiv. Rights (G) (0.12)
<1.522>
Observations 51 51 51 51 51 51
The instruments used are the log of settler mortality and English legal origin. Standard errors in
parentheses and beta coefficients in brackets. *** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05.
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Appendix A2
A Theoretical Model of Migration and Access to Credit
A2.1 Overview
Credit markets in underdeveloped countries exhibit a number of well-studied
phenomena, chief among them being credit rationing, wherein some potential bor-
rowers are unable to borrow the full capital they may want, and some may be unable
to borrow at all. Theoretical explainations of these phenomena typically highlight
asymmetric information and contract enforcement problems. As GMR note, these
can be thought of separately as issues arising from voluntary and involuntary de-
fault, although they share commonalities in the incentive problems around borrower
behavior. Challenges with involuntary default often arise from adverse selection and
moral hazard issues, while voluntary default reflects weak contract enforcement. All
three issues may exist simultaneously, and I assess their relevance empirically. In
this section, I lay out a theoretical model focused on voluntary default that arises
when contract enforcement is weak–as is the case in many developing countries. I
use simulations to illustrate how reduced access to credit for migrants can arise as
a disciplining device.
GMR show that an individual borrower’s ability to strategically default can
lead to credit rationing, as lenders cannot raise the interest rate to account for the
higher risk of default because doing so increases the incentive of the borrower to
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default. GMR use a simple infinite horizon repeated lending-borrowing game to
illustrate this, abstracting away from any production uncertainty to focus on the
issue of strategic default by the borrower. They identify the effect of the borrower’s
outside option from defaulting and turning to another lender in future periods on her
probability of repayment of her current loan. This tradeoff between current repay-
ment and the future probability of getting a loan bounds the maximum repayment
amount that is sustainable in equilibrium. GMR then show that providing lenders
with a technology that detects past repayment behavior can weaken a borrower’s
outside option, incentivizing her to repay her loan to avoid exclusion from future
borrowing. That is, lenders share information on a borrower’s repayment history
and follow a trigger strategy that rejects loan applicants with prior defaults. GMR
allow this information sharing technology to vary in quality and show that a more
effective technology–one with better detection of past defaults–can lead to a more
efficient outcome, with pareto improvements to both borrowers and lenders.
I extend the GMR model in two key ways: First, I incorporate information
dissipation over space. The intuition is that information sharing among lenders may
be weaker when the lenders are located in different towns than when they are located
in the same town. To model this, I create two separate pools of potential lenders:
those within a location and those outside of it (i.e., in other locations). Lenders
in other locations detect a borrower’s prior defaults with lower probability than
do lenders within a location. Second, I extend the GMR model by incorporating
heterogeneity in individuals’ migration costs, which include both a permanent and a
time-varying component. Essentially, some particularly mobile entrepreneurs with
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low permanent migration costs are perennial flight risks, while other entrepreneurs
may move because of a one-time shock. Lenders cannot observe these migration
costs and thus must form expectations about entrepreneurs’ future migration and
repayment strategies. In so doing, they lump migrants who are repeat defaulters
together with those who may have stronger repayment prospects. This creates an
inefficiency because the decisions of particularly mobile borrowers impose external
costs–in the form of a lower probability of obtaining a loan–on borrowers who moved
because of a temporary shock.
The model provides an explanation of credit rationing for migrants. If the
expected repayment from lending to any one migrant is sufficiently low to make the
average profitability of lending to migrants negative, lenders may choose not to lend
to migrants at all. Even if the average profitability from any one migrant is positive,
lenders may consider the effects of their lending policies on migration incentives (such
as the effect on future generations of entrepreneurs in an overlapping generations
framework). In some cases, lenders will randomly exclude some migrants in order
to reduce the incentives for default and migration among those who are particularly
likely to default. Some of the migrants who are randomly excluded may indeed be
creditworthy, as they would plan to stay and repay their loans.
Below, I lay out the set-up, assumptions, objectives, and outcomes of the
model.
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A2.2 Set-up and assumptions
As in GMR, my model involves a multi-period game among infinitely lived
entrepreneurs and lenders. These entrepreneurs and lenders are distributed over
an infinite set of discrete locations, and there are a large number of lenders and
entrepreneurs at each location.
Since involuntary default is not the focus of this model, I omit all production
uncertainty. Each entrepreneur has a non-stochastic production function F (L),
where L is the value of all inputs used in production. The production function
satisfies standard conditions: F ′(L) > 0 and F ′′(L) < 0. As each entrepreneur has
no capital of her own, she must borrow all capital and obtain a loan of size L. She
maximizes her utility over her income by considering her output (F (L)) as well as
the financing and migration costs she must incur.
In each period, the following actions take place:
1. Each entrepreneur applies for a loan from a lender.
2. A lender observes whether the entrepreneur is a migrant or native and screens
the potential borrower, detecting past default with some probability.
3. If a lender detects a default, it follows a trigger strategy of never lending to
that entrepreneur.
4. If a lender does not detect default, it offers natives a loan contract L,R,
where R is the repayment amount; it follows a mixed strategy with respect to
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migrants, offering some share ρ of migrants this loan contract1 .
5. If an entrepreneur successfully obtains a loan, she produces and earns the
relevant return, then decides whether to repay the loan.
6. If an entrepreneur does not obtain a loan, she must wait until the next period
when she can apply to another lender.
7. Finally, each entrepreneur decides whether to remain in the current location
or migrate to another location and incur a migration cost.
Each individual can migrate to any of the infinite set of discrete locations.
Moving involves costs that are heterogeneous across individuals and over time:
Cit = ci − γit (A.1)
where
ci ∼ U(0, c)
γit ∈ {−γ, γ}
Essentially, each person has a permanent individual migration cost of ci and
experiences transitory migration cost shocks of γit. These migration “costs” may
be negative, implying that agents may obtain a utility benefit from migration. For
simplicity, I assume that prob(−γ) = prob(γ) = 1
2
, and that γit is distributed inde-
1For ease of exposition, I focus on lender choices over the number of migrants who receive credit
rather than over the interest rate charged to these migrants. GMR’s basic result is that, in some
cases, raising the interest rate may not raise lender profits because repayment rates decline. Even
if lenders could charge migrants higher rates in our model, a similar rationing equilibrium may
still be obtained because these higher rates would be constrained by the migrants’ outside option
of repeat migration and default.
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pendently of ci. I also assume that γit affects the initial period mobility costs but
that future mobility costs are not present (i.e. γit = 0 ∀t > 1)2.
Crucially, lenders cannot observe these mobility costs, making them unable to
distinguish whether an entrepreneur who has moved experienced a one-time mobility
shock or is more permanently mobile. Initially, entrepreneurs are distributed across
the locations independently of their migration costs.
Before describing the objectives and actions of entrepreneurs and lenders, we
must make one more set of assumptions about the effectiveness of the information
sharing or screening technology used by lenders. Extending GMR’s model, I allow
the effectiveness of the technology to vary depending on where an individual’s de-
fault has taken place. If a borrower defaults on the current loan and stays in the
same location, other lenders can always uncover her past default3. However, if the
borrower migrates to a new location, other lenders can only detect her past default
in previous locations with some lower probability, say q, where q < 1. Thus, there
is a full “scarring” or reputational effect of defaulting for natives, but some of this
information is dissipated when individuals migrate.
2This assumption eases tractability but is not crucial; without it, a borrower would face more
than the six lifetime plan options identified under this assumption, but the basic mechanics would
remain similar.
3A more general formulation would allow for some lower probability of detection even within a
location. In this case, there may be credit rationing even for natives in a given location, but there
would be a greater probability of rationing for migrants to this location. Because I concentrate on
the latter effect in this paper, I focus on the special case where the probability within a location
is equal to one
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A2.3 Entrepreneur Objectives
Each entrepreneur begins her adult life with a clean slate (no migration or
default in her history). Let us consider the entrepreneur’s problem at the moment
when she must make her first choices whether to repay and whether to migrate. She
maximizes her utility by taking into account the probability of receiving a loan and
thus being able to produce in the next period, the repayment amount, her migration
costs, and her continuation value from the next period onward:
vit = max
rt,mt
[xt + δE(vi,t+1(rt+1,mt+1, |rt,mt)] (A.2)
where rt and mt indicate the borrower’s choices of repayment and migration for the
current period (each ∈ {0, 1}), xt is the borrower’s net income for the current period
and vi,t+1 is the borrower’s continuation value. Her net income for the current period
depends on her choices over repayment and migration as follows:
xt = F (L)− rtR−mt(ci − γit) (A.3)
where ci and γit are her migration cost parameters, as previously specified. In this
dynamic programming problem, the choice variables in each period consist of rt and
mt. In future periods, past choices over these variables become state variables (i.e.,
rt and mt become state variables in periods t + 1 onward), since they affect the
future probability of getting a loan.
One of the key outcomes of the model is that the equilibrium probability of
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getting a loan depends on an entrepreneur’s migration decision. Here, I outline the
entrepreneur’s expectations over this probability and show in the subsequent section
how these expectations can be rationalized by considering lenders’ objectives. The
probability of getting a loan in the next period is 0 if she defaults and remains in the
same location, 1 if she repays and stays, ρ(1− q) if she defaults and moves, and ρ if
she repays and moves (where ρ is the borrower’s expectations of lender strategies)4.
Because there is no chance of getting a loan after defaulting and remaining
in one’s current location, we can conclude that defaulters will always move. This
leaves three potential strategies in the first period: repay and stay, repay and move,
and default and move. I solve this problem in two stages: I first consider the
continuation values from pursuing each of the three strategies, and then add the
first period payoffs to these continuation values to evaluate the total lifetime payoffs
from each of the possible strategies.
A2.3.1 Future Periods
We first consider borrowers who repayed their loans and stayed in their current
locations in the first period. The state variables are thus set to rt = 1 and mt = 0.
At this point, her repayment in period t (R) is a sunk cost, though this will enter
into her utility maximization in period t. Each borrower must maximize her utility
over rt+1 and mt+1, as follows:
4The effects of migration and default on the likelihood of obtaining future loans do not dete-
riorate over time. Once migrants are labeled as such, they cannot escape this label, and must
bear the reduced likelihood of obtaining a loan forever. Similarly, once borrowers default, their
likelihood of obtaining a loan is permanently reduced.
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E(vi,t+1(rt+1,mt+1|rt = 1,mt = 0)) = max
rt+1,mt+1
[xt+1(rt+1,mt+1|rt = 1,mt = 0) (A.4)
+δE(vi,t+2(rt+2,mt+2|rt+1,mt+1, rt = 1,mt = 0))]
where the utility from her three options over combinations of rt+1 and mt+1 is
as follows:
E(vi,t+1|rt = 1,mt = 0, rt+1 = 1,mt+1 = 0) = F (L)−R + (A.5)
δE(vi,t+2|rt = 1,mt = 0, rt+1 = 1,mt+1 = 0)
E(vi,t+1|rt = 1,mt = 0, rt+1 = 1,mt+1 = 1) = ρ(F (L)−R)− ci + (A.6)
δE(vi,t+2|rt = 1,mt = 0, rt+1 = 1,mt+1 = 1)
E(vi,t+1|rt = 1,mt = 0, rt+1 = 0,mt+1 = 1) = ρ(1− q)(F (L))− ci + (A.7)
δE(vi,t+2|rt = 1,mt = 0, rt+1 = 0,mt+1 = 1)
The only benefit of migration in this model (after the first period) is in poten-
tially escaping the implications of default, so moving without defaulting is inferior
to staying and repaying (except in the first period, as discussed below). That is,
E(vi,t+2|rt = 1,mt = 0, rt+1 = 1,mt+1 = 0) ≥ E(vi,t+2|rt = 1,mt = 0, rt+1 = 1,mt+1 = 1)
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and thus the value in Eq. A.5 ≥ Eq. A.6
This eliminates the possibility that individuals will repay their loans and move
in future periods, but allows borrowers to still choose to “repay and move” in the
first period. This formulation focuses on the variation in borrower behavior induced
by one-time shocks to their mobility in the first period. This has the advantage
of both clarity and producing hypotheses that can be empirically tested using my
identification strategy. In a more general framework, these shocks could be recurring.
The issue is then whether these borrowers who have previously repayed their
loans and stayed in their first locations choose to again repay their loans and remain
in their location or to default and migrate. For tractability, we impose the condition
that they expect to repeat these choices in all future periods. The infinite period
values from repaying and staying (Eq. A.5) or defaulting and moving (Eq. A.7)
thus converge to the following:




E(vi,t+1|rt = 1,mt = 0, rt+1 = 0,mt+1 = 1) =
1
1− δ
[ρ(1− q)(F (L))− ci]
(A.9)
We next consider borrowers who repay their loans and move in the first period.
Again, we will impose the requirement that their future strategies be continued over
all periods. We observe that, since these individuals cannot escape their “migrant”
and “defaulter” labels, migrating again bears no benefit unless one plans to default.
As such, the two options again available to the borrower are to stay in her new
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location and repay her loan or default and move again:




E(vi,t+1|rt = 1,mt = 1, rt+1 = 0,mt+1 = 1) =
1
1− δ
[ρ(1− q)(F (L))− ci]
(A.11)
Finally, we consider borrowers who defaulted on their initial loans and mi-
grated. Again, the two options available to these borrowers are to stay and repay
their loans or default and move:





E(vi,t+1|rt = 0,mt = 1, rt+1 = 0,mt+1 = 1) =
1
1− δ
[ρ(1− q)(F (L))− ci]
(A.13)
A2.3.2 Initial Period
We can thus summarize the borrower’s problem in the current period as choos-
ing from one of six possible lifetime strategies (two continuation values for each of
the three possible strategies in the initial period):
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Figure A2.1: Entrepreneur’s Possible Lifetime Strategies
 
















Substituting the continuation value for future periods into the first period
maximization problem, one can calculate the borrower’s expected lifetime utility
from each potential strategy. Beginning with the strategy involving staying and
repaying in the first period, one can add the first period net income (F (L)−R) to
each of the continuation values (as in Eqs. A.8 and A.9). Rearranging terms, we
obtain the values of pursuing either of these two lifetime strategies:
E(vit|rt = 1,mt = 0, rt+1 = 0,mt+1 = 1) =
1
1− δ
[(1− δ + δρ(1− q))F (L)
−δci]−R (A.14)




Similarly, one can consider the two strategies that involve repaying and moving
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in the first period. The first period net income for these strategies is equal to
F (L) − R − ci − γit. Incorporating the continuation values for the two options in
future periods (as in Eqs. A.10 and A.11), we obtain the following lifetime values
for these strategies:
E(vit|rt = 1,mt = 1, rt+1 = 0,mt+1 = 1) =
1
1− δ
[ρ(1− δ + δ(1− q))F (L)
−ci]− ρR + γit (A.16)
E(vit|rt = 1,mt = 1, rt+1 = 1,mt+1 = 0) =
1
1− δ
ρ[F (L)−R]− ci + γit
(A.17)
Finally, we consider the stratgies for a borrower who defaults and moves in
the first period. She generates a net income of F (L) − ci − γit in the first period.
Adding the continuation values (as in Eqs. A.12 and A.13), the lifetime values of
her two potential strategies become:
E(vit|rt = 0,mt = 1, rt+1 = 0,mt+1 = 1) =
1
1− δ
[ρ(1− q)F (L)− δR]
−ci + γit (A.18)
E(vit|rt = 0,mt = 1, rt+1 = 1,mt+1 = 0) =
1
1− δ
[ρ(1− q)F (L)− ci] + γit
(A.19)
A borrower’s optimal choice among these six lifetime strategies depends on
her migration costs (ci, γit). Moreover, those entrepreneurs who move in the first
period (mt = 1) may still vary in their plans for repayment (rt+1). These differences
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are driven in part by the size of the initial mobility shock (γit) they experience.
Some entrepreneurs whose permanent mobility costs are high but who experienced
a large positive shock in the first period will choose to repay and migrate in the
first period, staying in their new locations and repaying their loans in the future.
Other entrepreneurs who have low permanent mobility costs will choose to default
and move in the first period; these individuals are also more likely to continue
defaulting and migrating in the future. However, because lenders cannot observe an
entrepreneur’s mobility costs, they will not be able to distinguish between migrants
of the first kind, who experience a one-time mobility shock, and migrants of the
second kind, whose prior defaults go undetected.
A2.4 Lender Objectives
Lenders maximize their expected profits from making each loan, taking into
account the probability of its repayment. I concentrate on lender profits from loans
to migrants. The key choice variable on which I focus is the proportion of migrant
applicants to which a lender will provide loans (ρ). At this point, one must take a
stand on the extent to which lenders coordinate their treatment of migrants. If they
do not coordinate their efforts at all, then each lender’s choice of the proportion of
migrants who receive loans would not affect migrants’ past decisions or expectations
of future loan repayment (since these are formed based on expectations over large
numbers of possible lenders). However, we have assumed that there is some infor-
mation sharing among lenders and coordination around punishments for detected
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default, particularly among lenders within a given location. Moreover, coordination
in strategies may be easier to sustain than coordination in information sharing on
repayment histories5.
If we assume that there is some coordination among lenders, each lender’s
choice of ρ will take into consideration the effect on repayment prospects (prob(rt+1|mt =
1; ρ)) as well as on the stock of migrants (prob(mt = 1; ρ)). The first term repre-
sents the probability that any individual migrant will repay her loan in period t+ 1.
The latter term captures the probability that any individual migrates in period t.
Since there are a large number of borrowers, this can be interpreted as the share of
migrants in the total population at the beginning of period t+ 1.





prob(rt+1 = 1|mt = 1; ρ)R− (1 + z)L
]
prob(mt = 1; ρ)
(A.20)
where z is the lender’s opportunity cost of capital. In their profit maximization,
lenders form expectations over the different repayment probabilities of migrants of
different types (high or low initial mobility costs). That is, lenders expect that the
repayment probability of the average migrant will be the probability of each type
5As one explanation, it may be easier for another lender to observe whether a bank has lent
money to an individual than to know whether the individual repaid the loan.
6For simplicity, I consider a lender’s one-period profits. A more general formulation might con-
sidering lenders’ profits over both the first and future periods jointly, leading to even more intensive
rationing of migrants in t+ 1 as lenders reduce incentives for default in period t. Nonetheless, the
basic sources of rationing in the model would remain the same.
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weighted by its share in the total population of migrants:
p(rt+1 = 1|mt = 1) = p(rt+1 = 1|mt = 1, γi,t = −γ) ∗ (1− ω)
+p(rt+1 = 1|mt = 1, γi,t = γ) ∗ ω
where ω is the share of migrants who experienced an increase in mobility costs due
to γ (”high shock”), and (1−ω) is the share who experienced a decrease in mobility
costs (”low shock”). We obtain ω by aggregating the migration choices of each type






p(mt = 1|γi,t = γ, ci)f(ci)dci (A.21)
Again, if lenders could observe each individual’s distinct migration cost compo-
nents, they could differentiate their lending to these different types. As they cannot
observe this information, they must treat this heterogeneous group uniformly.
A2.5 Joint Outcomes
Based on these objectives, entrepreneurs make individual repayment and mi-
gration decisions conditional on their expectation of lender rationing of migrants,
while lenders make loan decisions conditional on the composition of repayment de-
cisions among migrants. An equilibrium is reached when these lending decisions are
rationalized by entrepreneur behavior.
As borrower strategies are discrete choices, no closed form solutions for this
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equilibrium need exist. I therefore use simulations to provide an example under
which it is not profit maximizing for lenders to extend credit to all migrants. These
simulations illustrate how individuals who experience a “high” mobility shock (γit =
γ) may move in the first period but may then plan on repaying their loans at higher
rates than other migrants (i.e. those who experience a “low” mobility shock). Each
simulation uses the parameters to evaluate borrowers’ utility under each of the
six possible strategies and then select an optimal choice. These choices are then
aggregated to reflect average outcomes for each type (γit). One can then study the
resulting average probability of repayment for all migrants and its implications for
lender revenues and profits.
I show the resulting average probability of repayment for all migrants, which
may be lower than that the repayment probability among the “high shock” types.
Table A.5 shows an equilibrium is reached when ρ = 0.9, i.e., when 10% of migrants
are rationed. Table A.6 shows that raising the value of ρ to serve all migrants can
lower the probability of repayment among migrants, thereby reducing the expected
revenue of serving migrants. Since total costs increase along with the volume of
loans to migrants, the total profits from serving all migrants is lower than from
serving only 90%. Under these conditions, lenders may choose to ration migrants in
order to induce them to choose repayment of loans rather than default, as well as to
reduce the incentive for initial migration (since this creates a stock of more opaque
applicants).
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Table A.5: Simulation 1, Rationing Migrants
Parameters
F (L) = 1.0 R = 0.9 δ = 0.9 q = 0.1 γ = 0.5 c = 1.0 ρ = 0.9
Results
Individual mobility shock(γit) High (γ) Low (−γ)
Percent migrate in first period (mt = 1) 100% 20%
Share of migrants (p(γit|mt = 1)) 83% 17%
Probability of repayment in t+ 1 (p(rt+1 = 1|γit)) 30% 0%
Probability of repayment in t+ 1 for all migrants
(p(rt+1 = 1|mt))
25%
Expected revenues from serving migrants 0.135
(E(R p(rt+1 = 1|mt)p(mt)))
Table A.6: Simulation 2, Serving All Migrants
Parameters
F (L) = 1.0 R = 0.9 δ = 0.9 q = 0.1 γ = 0.5 c = 1.0 ρ = 1.0
Results
Individual mobility shock(γit) High (γ) Low (−γ)
Percent migrate in first period (mt = 1) 100% 30%
Share of migrants (p(γit|mt = 1)) 77% 23%
Probability of repayment in t+ 1 (p(rt+1 = 1|γit)) 20% 0%
Probability of repayment in t+ 1 for all migrants
(p(rt+1 = 1|mt))
15%
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